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Preface
In the Spring of 2020, a new master’s level course “Geographies of Inequalities” started 
at the department of Geosciences and Geography, University of Helsinki. The idea was 
to promote critical understanding of sustainability policies, their interconnections in 
different geographical levels, and also critical reading of indicators used for measuring 
the sustainability goals. The course was open also to exchange students in geography 
and students from other master’s programs at the University of Helsinki. In practice, this 
meant that scientific backgrounds of the students varied substantially. This can be seen as a 
positive thing, since it also taught the students to deal with different scientific approaches. 
Around thirty students participated in the course which incorporated lectures, individual 
reading assignments and work in small groups. Each group chose its own theme, through 
which to discuss issues of global governance of sustainable development and the 
interdependencies between actions at different geographical levels. Depending on the theme, 
sustainable development was approached via economic, socio-cultural and ecological 
frameworks. Profound questions for all groups were the ability of UN’s Sustainability 
Development Goals to recognize the connections between different goals, and the availability 
of data concerning the goals.  The course culminated in a final seminar, in which groups 
presented their central findings. This report is a compilation of the work of all groups. 
For the National Audit Office of Finland (VTV), the collaborative course was an opportunity 
to get inspiration for it’s own work. VTV’s approach to the sustainable development 
includes, besides the long-term approach (future generations) and the three dimensions 
of sustainability (environmental, social and economic), a third aspect – the global 
perspective. If we wish to achieve Agenda 2030 and the SDGs, we cannot concentrate 
only on the performance and effectiveness of our government’s actions in our country. On 
top of that, it is useful to consider what are the possible global effects of national actions. 
These spillover effects can be unintended, and they can be either positive or negative.
We carried out this course during the covid-19 virus outbreak. After only two meetings, we had 
to switch the course into an online format. We wish to thank all students for their flexibility and 
commitment to the course, even when the opportunity for face-to-face discussions was lost. 
Special thanks to our course assistants Sari Aroalho and Julia Viertola for putting this course 
report together and for coordinating group work. We are also grateful to Thomas Hanell and 
Karoliina Pilli-Sihvola for their contribution in the input lectures, as well as all the participants 
from the European Court of Auditors, Finnish National Audit Office, Prime Minister’s Office 
and HELSUS for their valuable comments in the final seminar, carried out as a webinar. 
Helsinki 29.4.2020
Pia Bäcklund & Vivi Niemenmaa
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Introduction
The United Nations (UN) adopted the Agenda 2030, the action plan for sustainable 
development and Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) in 2015. SDGs are a continuum 
to the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) from 2000 and Rio Process dating back to 
1992. There are 17 SDGs with 169 targets aimed to achieve by 2030. Globally, much has 
been achieved, but much remains to be done. (United Nations, 2015; United Nations 2019). 
The progress of Sustainable Development Goals can be measured in different ways. 
UN has developed 231 global indicators to measure the progress at the global level 
(SDG indicators, 2020). In addition, tracking can take place at country level (e.g. 
Valtioneuvoston kanslia 2019) and for example at EU level (Eurostat 2019). Many of the 
indicators measure the same targets in slightly different ways. Although the indicators aim 
at providing an objective picture of the reality, their selection and data collection methods 
are always influenced by the institutional practices and individuals who collects the data 
and interpret the results (Hanell, 2019). Caballero (2019) and Hanell (2019) point out that 
measurements bring politics to data, when you condense and present issues in one number. 
Governing by numbers is common, and this also applies to SDGs (SDG: Indicators and a 
Monitoring…, 2020). The SDGs are broad goals with several targets that are sometimes difficult to 
grasp. The question is, do the SDG indicators measure the right issues? Globally there are phenomena, 
which affect a certain country, but the reasons might be derived from other seemingly unrelated 
events in other locations. These effects are called spillovers, and we are examining, whether they 
are recognized and whether there is data available on them in order to take spillovers into account.
The SDGs aim to develop world sustainably, and one manifestation are the various global 
agreements (e.g. SDG 7, policy brief, 2018). Unfortunately, while countries’ governments 
are paying attention to their performance within their borders, a lot of important impacts 
can be neglected if there is no attention to goods flowing in and out having effects to other 
regions (SDG, 2020). Energy produced with coal in neighbouring country can be exported 
but not calculated in importing country’s emissions, and the water usage embedded in 
producing goods outside country’s borders are examples of spillovers, which are often 
not payed attention to. The multinational nature of manufacturing creates challenges in 
considering, what is a spillover and who is responsible of them (Abramavičius, 2019)? 
“In order to pursue 'policy coherence for sustainable development', the externalities
and spillover effects of European policies, production and consumption patterns
need to be taken into account.” (Meynen & Niestroy, 2019). Spillovers take place for 
instance in the processing of plastic waste: it can be produced in one place, consumed 
in another and then disposed to a third. We often take only the consumption part of the 
supply chain into account but managing the waste in third party countries creates impacts 
on environment and society (Science and Technical Advisory Panel, 2018). Spillovers 
are difficult to measure and take into account because supply chains are nowadays 
complex and international. (Schmidt-Traub, Hoff & Bernlöhr, 2019; SDG, 2020). 
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Many of the early stages of supply chains take place in Global South. In the discourse 
of SDGs there is a great inequality between regions geographically. Most of the 
negative spillovers affect countries, which do not have power to change global relations 
(Radcliffe, 2004). For example, even though clothing industry in global south creates (low-
paid) jobs, it also affects the local society by weakening their quality of life and health. 
As another example, EU’s Common Agricultural Policy concentrates in the agricultural 
production in the EU but ends up having negative effects to agriculture in Africa. 
The five mentioned themes are analyzed in this report. They are important topics for consideration 
in Finland, but also on EU level and globally. Outsourcing is essential part of global world and it is 
one of the causes of spillover effects (Khadraoui, 2019). Geographic vantage points will look into 
the differences and dynamics between high-income and low-income countries, the global injustice 
and where the burden of spillover effects take place. Achieving SDGs is challenging because of 
complexity and it is important to see behind the numbers which countries are providing to the public. 
Sari Aroalho & Julia Viertola
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The Water Footprint of Finland: a critical review 
about the spillover eff ects of water consumption 
and the use of the Water Footprint Network
Valentin Charlier, Matilda Dok, Julia Keronen, Henna Kukkola
Photo: Sari Aroalho
Introduction 
Water footprint is a tool to study the total volume 
of water use including direct and indirect water 
use, and it can be calculated for example for a 
geographical area such as a nation or water basin, for a 
single product, for a consumer or a group of 
consumers or organisation (Zhang et al. 2013). It 
was developed in analogy to the ecological footprint 
concept, and its aim was to have a consumption-based 
indicator of water use in contrast to the traditional 
production-based tools (Hoekstra & Chapagain 2007). 
Access to clean water and sanitation for all is one 
of the Sustainable Development Goals (Goal 6), 
and “water scarcity affects more than 40 percent 
of the global population and is projected to rise” 
(SDG website 2020). The climate change makes 
weather conditions more and more unpredictable 
and adds to the frequency of droughts in some areas. 
Even with vast amounts of natural freshwater 
resources to consume locally, Finland has an 
impact in this global problem as well. The 
consumption of goods such as coffee produced in 
countries with greater water scarcity makes Finland an 
important contributor to the global water crisis and 
increases the need to find more sustainable ways to 
use water and lower our collective water footprint. 
Aim of report  
 
The aim of this report is to study the main issues of 
the Finnish water use and to consider how the Water 
Footprint Network (WFN) could be more useful 
in Finland. This subject is important, because the 
water use in Finland has significant spillover effects 
in other areas. Our geographical point of view is 
useful when comparing the problem and effects 
between different areas and locations, which all have 
their geographical characteristics. One of our aims 
is to approach and review these subjects critically. 
In this report, we will approach the theme with 
several sections. First, we will clarify some of 
the main concepts such as the concept of water 
footprint and spillover effect. We will study the 
current main problems of Finnish water footprint 
and its global spillover effects by comparing and 
analysing the Finnish water consumption with some 
product examples and visualizations. We will try 
to assess the link between the water footprint and 
the SDG’s based on the Water Footprint Network. 
Materials 
This work is divided into three main parts concerning 
the water footprint. Firstly, a review of the literature 
on the definition of the water footprint concept, the 
global water consumption, and a comparison with the 
specific case of Finland's water footprint. Secondly, 
the use of the example of coffee consumption in 
Finland to illustrate the global spillover effects of 
the water footprint and the impact generated on the 
achievement of the SDG goals. Finally, an analysis of 
the Water Footprint Network (WFN) showing what it 
is, what its objectives are, what applications can be 
made in Finland and showing what the limitations of 
the network are in the study of water consumption. 
The data used for this report is the data on the global 
water footprint in the period 1996-2005 from the 
WFN website, scientific sources on water footprint 
and its consequences. These data are used because 
they are currently the most comprehensive and freely 
available data on water consumption around the world. 
Discussion 
Water Footprint in Finland regarding to the other 
nations 
The water footprint is defined by the measure of 
human’s appropriation of freshwater resources 
which are assessed by the water volumes consumed 
(Evaporation, consumption) or/and polluted per 
unit of time (Hoekstra, 2011). The water footprint 
can be divided into three main components: The 
Blue water footprint which refers to consumption of 
surface and groundwater resources, the Green water 
footprint which assesses the volume of rainwater 
consumed (agriculture and crops production) and 
the Grey water footprint which reflects the degree 
of freshwater pollution. Indeed, this is defined 
by the volume of freshwater that is required to 
assimilate the load of pollutants based on existing 
ambient water quality standards (Hoekstra, 2011). 
On a national scale, the study of water footprint 
is divided in two different parts: the water 
footprint of national consumption and the water 
footprint of national production (Hoekstra, 2011).
  
The water footprint of national production 
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represents the total volume of freshwater consumed 
or polluted within the territory of the nation as 
a result of activities within the diff erent sectors 
of the economy. The three main sectors of water 
using are the agricultural, the industrial and the 
domestic water supply sectors (Hoekstra, 2011). 
The water footprint of national consumption represents 
the total volume of freshwater used to produce goods 
and services consumed by the inhabitants from a 
nation and it can be described by its two components 
(Figure 1): the internal water footprint of national 
consumption which shows the use of domestic water 
resources to produce goods and services consumed by 
the nation’s population and the external water footprint 
of national consumption which describes the volume 
of water resources used in other nations to produce 
goods and services consumed by the population 
within the importing nation (Hoekstra, 2011). 
Global water footprint  
According to the study of Hoekstra and Mekkonen 
(2011) the global water footprint between 1996 and 
2005 was 9087 Gm3 and it was in average 1385 
m3 /y per capita. The green water footprint was 
the biggest components with 74% of freshwater 
consumed (Figure 2), followed by the blue water 
footprint (11%) and the grey water footprint (15%). 
The green water footprint importance is refl ected 
by the agricultural sector which contributed 92% 
of the total water footprint. In average, the study 
showed that the agricultural sector represented by 
the pasture, the crop production and the animal’s 
breeding are the main parts of the water footprint 
production and the one which consumed the greater 
amount of fresh water (green, blue and grey water), it 
is followed next by the industrial production (4,7%) 
and the domestic water supply (3,8%) (Table 1). 
In total of water footprint of consumption in the world, 
the main players are China with a total water footprint 
of 1368 Gm3/y, followed by India and the United States 
with a total water footprint of 1145 and 821 Gm3/y 
respectively (Hoekstra, 2012). On average, the water 
footprint per capita ranges from 1250 to 2850 m3/y 
per capita in industrialized countries and from 550 to 
3800 m3/y per capita in developing countries. These 
diff erences can be explained by diff erences in water 
consumption and production practices (Hoekstra, 
2012). Finally, it is important to note that there is 
a relatively high dependency on water resources 
between countries. Indeed, about 22% of the countries 
global water footprint is due to the global external 
water footprint of consumption (Hoekstra, 2012). 
Finnish water footprint  
The Finnish Water Footprint (WF) is not only 
measured for individuals, businesses, and cities 
within Finland, but also countries that it trades 
products and services with (Hoekstra and Mekonnen, 
2012). A Finn's daily domestic water consumption 
Figure 1: The water footprint consumption based on the studies of WWF-Suomi (2012).
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Figure 2: The green, blue, grey, and total water footprint of consumption between the period of 1996-2005 
(Hoekstra, 2011). 
Table 1: Global water footprint of production between 1996 and 2005 (Hoekstra, 2011). 
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(water used for cooking, washing, and cleaning) 
averages 150 L/day/inhabitant. Considering the 
consumption of water to produce drinks, food, 
clothing and other production/consumption goods, 
the daily water consumption of a Finn amounts 
to 3874 L/day/capita (WWF-Suomi, 2012). 
If we compare Finland’s water footprint with those of 
other nations, we can see that the water consumption 
footprint is 7.326 billion L/year and the annual 
footprint of a Finn is about 1414 m3 per capita per 
year, which is slightly higher than the world average 
(1358 m3 per capita per year). This high water 
footprint can be explained by the fact that despite its 
signifi cant fresh water resources such as surface water 
(187,888 lakes and ponds as well as 20,500 km of 
rivers) and deep water abstracted from groundwater, 
water footprint of Finland is largely due to the 
consumption of goods (agricultural or manufactured 
products, etc.) imported from other countries. The 
external water footprint of national consumption is 
of great importance in Finland's total water footprint 
(Hoekstra, 2011; WWF-Suomi, 2012). 
Indeed, the internal water footprint of national 
consumption was 53% and the external water 
footprint of national consumption was 47%, which 
means that Finland consumed almost as many goods 
and services produced within its borders as goods 
and services provided by other nations. Thus, when 
analysing the internal and external water consumption 
fi gures, some conclusions can be drawn (Hoekstra, 
2011; WWF-Suomi, 2012). Firstly, it is the production 
and consumption of agricultural goods that has the 
greatest impact on Finland's water footprint. In fact, 
considering water consumption from internal as well 
as foreign resources, the agricultural sector accounts 
for 82% of Finland's total water consumption footprint. 
Secondly, water consumption by the agricultural 
sector can be divided into the following categories: 
livestock products, agricultural food products, 
agricultural products, and agricultural products for 
human consumption. Indeed, 24% of Finland's water 
footprint is due to meat production and consumption, 
while 15% is due to dairy products, which is the same 
fi gure as the water footprint of the industrial sector. 
The consumption of tea, coff ee and cocoa contributes 
to 13% of Finland's annual water consumption and 
fi nally the production of cereals, sugars, vegetable 
oils, vegetables, and rubber accounts for the remaining 
30% of the agricultural sector (Figure 3). Thirdly, the 
industrial sector and domestic water consumption 
account for only 15% and 3% respectively of 
Finland's water consumption (Figure 3, Table 2). 
Finally, the biggest problem that can be observed is 
Finland's dependence on other nations. Globalisation 
has opened borders and made it possible to spread 
people, products, and knowledge, but it has also 
created a relationship of interdependence between 
producer and consumer countries. Finland is no 
exception to this rule, since around 42% of the 
agricultural products consumed by Finns come from 
abroad and more than 80% of its manufactured goods 
are imported. This explains why the external water 
Figure 3 : Total water footprint in Finland according diff erent sectors of water consumption(WWF-Suomi, 2012).
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footprint of national consumption accounts for almost 
half of Finland's total water footprint (Table 2). 
Issues and global spillover eff ects of water footprint 
in Finland 
The water footprint represents the total freshwater 
volume needed. It is important to realize that water 
footprints usually have spillover eff ects in wide areas. 
According to the World Wildlife Foundation, half 
of Finnish water footprint exists abroad, aff ecting 
countries that suff er from severe water shortage. One 
good example to study Finnish water footprint is to 
view the virtual water transfer. The products that 
Finns use have a little direct physical water transfer 
from other areas to Finland, but the virtual transfer 
of water is way more signifi cant. The virtual water 
content refers to the total volume of water that is 
needed to produce the product (Hoekstra, 2009). 
In line with sustainable development, material 
fl ows in industrialised countries must be reduced 
for production and consumption to be considered 
sustainable. Europe 2020 Resource effi  cient Europe3 
fl agship initiative underlines why Europe should 
engage in sustainable management of water as a 
key resource. On June 21st, 2011, the Council of 
the European Union acknowledged the importance 
of member states in achieving sustainable and 
effi  cient water use through partnership innovations. 
These innovations to increase water effi  ciency 
in industries that use a lot of water like energy 
production and chemical industry will reduce WF. 
The global giant coff ee retailer Starbucks, for 
example, focused on sustainable use of water 
within its stores, which cut water consumption 
by about 100 gallons (378 litres) of water per day, 
per store. This was achieved by discontinuing 
the use of dipper wells, fi xtures that constantly 
stream water to clean utensils and eliminate food 
residues. This responsibility should not only be at 
the company level, but also at the individual level. 
For citizens to be sensitive to their water footprint, 
proper market mechanisms should be set up, and 
there should be a criterion for water saving within 
a products life cycle. Quality and certifi cation 
systems like Eco-Management and Audit Scheme 
(EMAS), and eco-design and water friendly labels 
for products should be prioritized as proposed by 
the EU’s (2008) Committee of Regions to address 
water scarcity and droughts in the European Union. 
Finnish people use on average 10 kilos roasted coff ee 
per person in a year (Kahvin K. 2019), followed 
by Scandinavian countries Sweden (10.1 kg) and 
Norway (8.7 kg). Though Finland is a coff ee lover, 
and consumption is so rampant that it has bloomed 
into a culture, it represented only 2.0% of total 
European imports of green coff ee beans according 
to CBI Ministry of Foreign aff airs (2017) statistics. 
The coff ee consumed in Finland has multitudinous 
water consumption somewhere else. This WF of 
coff ee consumption consists mostly of crop water 
requirements in coff ee exporting areas, and the 
water requirements in processing (Chapagain & 
Hoekstra, 2007). The water that is needed for 
Table 2: Water footprint of national consumption (WWF-Suomi, 2012).
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coffee drinking in Finland, is not Finnish water. 
Almost all Finnish coffee is imported directly from 
developing countries, like Brazil, and re-exported to 
Russia and the Baltic states. This has expanded the 
labour market and led to an increase in employment 
opportunities for example the operation of companies 
like Starbucks which has its own Starbucks’ Coffee 
and Farmer Equity Practices that observes quality 
and sustainable coffee production, Nespresso which 
has Nespresso AAA Sustainable Quality, Paulig 
with its UTZ certified coffees and Meira with its 
fair-trade certified products. These certifications by 
different organizations and alliances are meant to 
guarantee the consumer that the products factor in 
sustainable development practises throughout its 
life cycles. Sustainable development as a concept 
is the convergence of the social, economic, and 
environmental considerations into a holistic practise. 
UTZ (2020) for example assures consumers that it 
incorporates gender equality and no child labour 
as well as environmental protection actions. 
In accordance with the UN’s (2020) 17 Sustainable 
Development Goals, guided by SDGs 2, 3, 6, 8, 9, 
12, and 13, the company or organisational coffee 
certifications ensure responsible production practices, 
inform you of the origin of your coffee products, ensure 
the wellbeing of people producing these products 
and wellbeing of the environment. Goal 6 and 12 
are particularly important because coffee processing 
involves dry and wet methods and the wet processing 
generates huge quantities of high strength wastewater 
requiring systematic treatment before disposal. 
Looking further into the SDGs, we realize that 
coffee production and consumption is intertwined 
in almost all of them. Goal 6 is crucial since water 
scarcity, inadequate sanitation and poor water quality 
affects food security and quality of life. Freshwater 
resources are dwindling according to WATCH (2011) 
and many people face chronic or recurring shortages 
of fresh water. Yet coffee requires a lot of rain or 
about 1500-2000 mm per year to grow. Hunger and 
malnutrition, which are supposed to be eradicated 
by SDG Goal 2 and 3, are worsened by drought in 
some of the world’s poorest countries according 
to the UN (2020). These countries are exporters of 
products that contribute to Finland’s virtual WF. 
Droughts in Brazil and Colombia trigger coffee price 
increases that translate to profits in the short term. 
Kaye (2011) counsels that with continuous drought, 
companies will be compelled to develop programmes 
that guarantee water conservation throughout 
their supply chains and especially at the farms. 
These droughts are however not limited to the 
developing world. Mikkonen (2019) reports that, in 
the year 2018, parts of Finland specifically Petäjävesi 
experienced drought due to hot summer, quoting 
mayor Eero Vainio. Children had to use wet-wipes, 
people used paper plates, avoided using house 
toilets and were advised to stop hoarding water. 
Climate change is another big challenge to the coffee 
industry. According to the Paulig Group website 
(2020), the temperature needed for coffee plants 
varies. Robusta requires 24-30 degrees yet arabica 
only requires 15-24 degrees. Through the Coffee 
and Climate project and the International Coffee 
Partners community, coffee growers are given 
online and contact training on best farming practices 
and climate smart agriculture and sensitized about 
climate change adaptations and mitigation. (Initiative 
for Coffee and Climate (c&c) website (2018)). 
Clearing forests to create space for coffee plantations 
without reforestation is discouraged. NGOs like 
Rainforest Alliance and Fair-Trade USA also empower 
farmers across the globe to handle reforestation 
projects, in addition to getting modest financial returns. 
The "shade grown" coffee preserves the watersheds 
by preventing erosion and provide drinking water. 
In our opinion, in order to achieve sustainable, 
profitable, and strong coffee businesses that 
survive the global water demand, and a happy 
consumer base, the water footprint must be analysed 
from time to time and effective management, 
preservation and conservation measures observed. 
 
Water Footprint Network (WFN) applied to Finland  
As we have observed in this text, the global water 
consumption and its spillover effects are past the point 
of sustainable. We are running out of available fresh 
water and suffering from uneven division of water 
between nations which affects almost all aspects of 
our lives. This phenomenon is further enhanced by 
the climate change. What is more, the current global 
competition of water resources is not so much caused 
by the increasing amount of human population 
in developing countries but by the over-use of 
resources by the developed nations and the spread 
of their consumption habits (WWF Suomi 2012). 
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Production chains using virtual water reach all over 
the globe. As a network of tools to combat the issue, 
the Water Footprint Network (WFN) was founded. 
The WFN is a non-profit organization with the aim 
to help partner communities and organizations with 
five main activities: 1. Network and Exchange, 
2. Awareness Raising, 3. Capacity Building, 
4. Knowledge and Data Dissemination and 5. 
Influencing Policy and Practice (Water footprint 
network 2020a). In their own words, their mission 
is “to use the water footprint concept to promote the 
transition toward sustainable, fair and efficient use 
of freshwater resources worldwide” (Water footprint 
network 2020a). The WFN’s goal is therefore to 
bring together professionals and organizations to 
form a network of people and businesses interested 
in their water use and its impact in the world. 
Together, they intend to start global conversation 
and spread information about the importance of 
water as a resource and how to use it sustainably 
in different areas of business and ultimately, life. 
The studies made about the Finnish water footprint 
are, for the moment, not created in collaboration 
with the WFN (Water footprint network 2020b). 
There are companies, organizations, universities, 
and governmental branches using the definition 
of water footprint provided by WFN in their 
independent publications (see for example Salminen 
et al. 2017, WWF Suomi 2012). Otherwise, there 
is a lack of any official collaboration. The water 
footprint is nevertheless growing its importance 
and interest in the minds of Finnish authorities as 
well as private companies. The ways to address the 
water footprint can be divided in those made by the 
state, the companies, and individual consumers. 
These where examined in a report about the Finnish 
water footprint published by WWF Suomi (2012). 
The most important responsibility of the state 
is to increase the nations knowledge on water 
footprint and its importance globally. In order to 
accomplish this, the water footprint should be 
nationally calculated and ensured that the water use 
in Finland is sustainable. By including sustainable 
water use in the national political narrative co-
operation between different economic sectors and 
across the borders a larger impact and reach to 
the global production chains could be achieved. 
Companies should be encouraged to create water 
strategies for their operational plans and production 
chains to both be aware and ultimately lower the 
need of environmentally unsustainable water. By 
taking care of the sustainability of their actions, they 
make it easier for consumers to choose water-friendly 
companies and products to use. Companies can also 
work with governments to highlight the possible 
problems existing within the legal framework to 
lower the risks the companies have regarding water 
use. Individuals have two goals: to get informed and 
to make an impact. Everything starts with acquiring 
information about both the importance of water 
footprint and their own consumption and its spillover 
effects globally. This way it is easier to make an impact 
by consumption choices and to demand companies to 
address their water footprint and rely on sustainable 
water sources during their production chain. 
Water footprint data criticism and analysis 
Even though we have seen widespread use of the 
definition of water footprint and the Finnish water 
footprint data published by the WFN, there is some 
criticism to present as well. First, the national data 
is published a decade ago, in 2011 with global and 
national changes in consumption habits, business, 
producers and technologies between 1996 and 2005 
(Hoekstra,2011), there is a need for updating of this 
data to better depict the current state of water use 
from the actual amounts of water to localities most 
impacted by Finnish water consumption. The second 
difficulty in obtaining recent water footprint data 
comes from product traceability. Indeed, imported 
and consumed products represent an important part 
of the national water footprint of consumption but 
it is complicated to trace step by step the origins of 
production of a product and the quantity of water 
used/polluted during these steps either because it is 
too laborious or because of a lack of transparency 
of the partner countries (Hoekstra,2012). 
Third, the water footprint indicator can vary 
considerably depending on the methodology used. 
Indeed, there are two types of approaches: Bottom 
up (taking into account the amount of water needed 
to make consumer goods and services throughout 
the manufacturing process) and top-down up 
(taking into account the total amount of water used 
in a country by adding the water used for imported 
products and subtracting the water used for exported 
products), which vary the results despite the fact 
that they are based on the same original data 
(Chenoweth, J., 2014). Fourth, separating water 
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use into three different colours (Blue, Green and 
Grey) raises issues about the accuracy of the water 
footprint as a policy tool. Indeed, the Blue and 
Green water footprints are relative to resource use 
while the Grey water footprint is an indicator of 
environmental impact, which confuses the results 
shown by the water footprint (Chenoweth, J., 2014). 
Finally, water consumption varies spatially and 
temporally, meaning that within a country and within 
a year there can be very large variations in water 
consumption. The proper application of the water 
footprint indicator will depend on a spatiotemporal 
scale of application. Indeed, on a national scale, 
the water footprint can provide information to 
guide major trends (agriculture, industry, trade,...) 
but on a local or regional scale this indicator is 
not the most suitable to guide decision making 
due to a lack of information about the opportunity 
costs of water resources, the spatial and temporal 
dimension as well as the socioeconomic and 
environmental context (Chenoweth, J., 2014). 
The water footprint is a well-functioning tool to 
study and address global and national issues created 
by water use. The strength of WFN is in providing 
information and data to its partners. By joining 
the network, Finnish organizations could demand 
actions and have a greater impact on both authorities 
and other organizations to aim for more sustainable 
use of water both in Finland and other parts of 
consumption chains of products they use and produce. 
The government should have the responsibility 
to ensure that different economic sectors address 
climate questions and the role water plays in them. 
Conclusions 
Throughout this report, we have been interested in 
Finland's water consumption, the global spillover 
effects and their impact on the achievement of the 
SDGs through the example of coffee consumption as 
well as the use of the WFN and its water footprint 
indicator as a decision-making tool. Although many 
criticisms can be made about the accuracy of the 
water footprint, the implementation of the WFN and 
its indicator has raised awareness of the problems 
related to water consumption in the world by 
highlighting for each nation the quantity, source and 
impact of different sectors of activity on water use. 
Finland's water footprint, half of which comes from 
imported products, also highlights the dependence on 
water between different nations with globalization 
and the importance of creating tools such as the WFN. 
Thus, the governments of Finland and other nations 
have great responsibility to impact the public and 
different organizations working inside and outside 
of their borders. In addition to creating new data 
and new publications, they are responsible for 
communicating the importance of water footprint 
and spreading information about how everyone 
can have an impact on personal, national, and 
global water use. Even if the direct impacts of 
water use cannot be seen where the commodity is 
bought, sometimes the predictable indirect impacts 
can and will ultimately affect everyone’s life. 
Photo: Sari AroalhoClan glacier water. 
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Coal leakage in electricity generation: 
Finland and the EU
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Introduction 
Finland has had significant energy and climate targets 
since the United Nations Framework Convention 
on Climate Change (UNFCCC) was organized in 
1992 (Kioton pöytäkirja, 2019), and in recent years, 
related policies have changed to become more 
ambitious. The aim has been to reduce the use of 
fossil fuels and utilize more renewable energy which 
demands comprehensive thinking in order to solve 
Finnish energy consumption challenges related to the 
sustainable development goals (Häyhä et al., 2011). 
However, the coal use situation in Finland is quite 
good because of the political will to prohibit the use 
of coal in electricity and heat production by 2029 
(Kivihiilen energiakäytön…, 2019). In addition, 
according to EU’s climate target for Finland, the 
greenhouse gas emissions (GHG) that are not 
related to EU’s emission trading system (EU-ETS) 
should decrease 39% compared to the situation in 
2005 (Finland’s Integrated…, 2019). Still, even 
though Finland has ambitious goals and it is in the 
top three in achieving the SDGs, there is a lot of 
work to be done due to high levels of consumption 
and the resulting negative spillover effects that 
have consequences beyond the national borders. 
Aim of report  
We will focus on coal-produced carbon leakage in 
electricity production in Finland by comparing it to 
the regulations of the European Emissions Trading 
Scheme (EU-ETS) and to actions made by Fortum - 
which is our case study example of carbon leakage. 
Our aim is to observe where the carbon leakage 
occurs and in what context. In addition, it is possible 
to observe which political decisions cause those 
negative spillover effects. The main concepts and 
topics are carbon leakage, electricity production, 
spillover effects and Finland as part of the EU-ETS. 
Researching the changes in energy production in 
Finland, it is reasonable to check the earlier global 
situation in the early 2000s. Graus et al. (2007) have 
studied coal-fired electricity generation and shown 
that generation has been significantly higher in the 
United States (ca. 2000 TWh) and China (ca. 1500 
TWh) compared to some European countries (on the 
average below 250 TWh), India, Japan, Korea and 
Australia. That is why the situation in Finland and 
Nordic countries has been relatively good. However, 
compared to other Nordic countries in the 2010s, the 
share of coal use in energy supply in 2017 has been 
the highest: Finland 4130 ktoe, Sweden 2046 ktoe, 
Denmark 1549 ktoe Norway 848 ktoe and Iceland 
99 ktoe (Total primary..., 2020). Again, the Finnish 
government decided in 2019 that the use of coal in 
electricity and heat production will be prohibited 
by 2029 (Kivihiilen energiakäytön…, 2019). That 
is why it is important to study how the need for 
electricity and heat will be replaced in the future, 
while coal-related carbon leakage is an existing threat. 
It is also important to cast a critical eye over Finland’s 
broader, indirect role in the global issue of carbon 
leakage. It is known that despite having ambitious 
climate targets, Finland also has one of the highest 
levels of consumption emissions globally (Hickel, 
2019). Additionally, the recent acquisition of shares 
in German energy company Uniper, by majority-
state-owned Fortum, raises important questions about 
accountability for carbon emissions, and highlights 
the necessity of rigorous indicator frameworks. 
This is explored in an in-depth case study below. 
Materials 
Research articles, acts, news reports and websites of 
energy agencies and companies are used in this report. 
During the initial stages of the research process, 
some challenges were encountered in finding topic-
specific data. “Coal leakage” is not a very frequently 
used concept and “carbon leakage” mostly concerns 
industries other than electricity. We decided to focus 
on electricity generation in Finland and study how the 
EU-ETS, SDGs and Finnish political decisions affect 
it. In addition, we have a case study of Fortum in this 
report that represents the current carbon politics from 
a corporate perspective. We choose the sources to form 
a general overview about the role of coal-produced 
electricity in Finland. After the process, we can still 
say it is challenging to find data about coal or carbon 
leakage. Others have probably encountered challenges 
in carrying out research for example, because of 
business secrets and prevailed political actions. 
The literature regarding EU-ETS is quite vast and 
easily accessible although, when digging deep into 
the material, it is harder to find concrete data and 
examples of coal leakage due to the fact that it is both, 
to some degree, difficult to measure and surrounded 
by some secrecy. The direct linkages and spillover 
effects are therefore not so easy to find literature 
about, but the theory behind it is more accessible. 
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Familiarizing with the SDGs and especially 
indicators related to our topic was more difficult than 
expected, because there are global SDGs and targets 
which differ from the more narrowed targets that also 
have measurable indicators. Also, there wasn’t much 
literature concerning the spillover effects, at least 
related to our topic, so these were more conclusions 
based on our background-research and knowledge. 
In the process of researching the Fortum case 
study, good use was made of resources provided by 
advocacy groups fighting for a cleaner, and more 
ethically responsible, coal supply chain including 
Hiilivapaa Suomi, Urgewald and Europe Beyond 
Coal. These resources provided a helpful overview 
of the key debates and issues in the topic, but it was 
recognised that their strong political leaning might 
lead to a certain level of bias. To remedy this, web 
pages, conferences and statements by Fortum and 
Uniper were explored to observe the other side of the 
argument, so to speak. In addition, a range of news 
providers were searched for reports on the topic. 
Since this is a very contemporary issue (Fortum 
have only finalised the purchase of Uniper shares 
in the past couple of months) it was difficult to find 
academic literature on this specifically. Nonetheless, 
it was felt that the materials available provided a 
firm basis upon which to begin asking the right 
questions, if not to find all the answers just yet. 
Discussion 
EU-ETS and the Nordics 
The European Union Emissions Trading Scheme 
(ETS) arose following a long process of agreeing on 
a market solution for reducing emissions in the EU. 
Previous attempts at introducing a carbon tax and 
the need to develop a new strategy after the Kyoto 
Conference of Parties under the UNFCCC led to the 
member states of the EU agreeing on the ETS. The 
ETS is the world’s largest emission-trading system and 
was the first when it came into effect in 2005. It is now 
seen as the cornerstone of the EU’s strategy to combat 
climate change (European Commission, 2019). 
One of the fundamental principles of the ETS is 
what is called “cap and trade”. This means that 
each participating country has a maximum amount 
of emissions it can emit - the cap - and if there are 
emissions to spare, these quotas or allowances can 
be traded within the system. Built into the ETS, 
there are also penalties to ensure the achievement 
of emission reductions (Convery, F. J., 2009). 
One of several sectors that are included in the ETS 
is electricity production. As the goal of the ETS is 
to reduce the emissions in different sectors and 
total in different phases, for the energy sector this 
means reducing the emissions over several years, 
mainly by stopping using high-emissions sources 
of energy and replacing them with a greener 
alternative. In this article, we will be looking at 
whether the reduction in emissions through the ETS 
simultaneously leads to a negative spillover effect 
by increasing the amount of coal-produced energy 
somewhere else - otherwise known as coal leakage. 
Within the ETS, certain industries are allocated 
so called 'free allowances' giving the industries 
that are exposed to large external competition 
the opportunity to emit more. This is a policy 
designed to avoid carbon leakage - considering 
that a price increase in that sector would lead to a 
large increase of carbon leakage by production 
moving out of the country to a higher-emissions 
country (Nordic Council of Ministers, 2019). 
As is argued by the Nordic Council of Ministers, the 
selection of which sectors receive free allowances 
is a political decision (Nordic Council of Ministers, 
2019). What constitutes a large threat of carbon 
leakage? How much should the free allowances 
amount to? These are questions that are up for 
discussion and that can have a great effect on carbon 
leakage. Furthermore, as the Nordic Council of 
Ministers argue, differentiation between sectors 
in the Nordics are too small, leading to a lack 
of focus in the effort to hinder carbon leakage. 
According to the Nordic Council of Ministers, 
the Nordic countries have a more intensive use of 
electricity than most other EU countries and the use 
of biofuels is also higher in the Nordics. In addition, 
a large part of the production industry in the Nordic 
region is based upon biofuels, with large biomass 
industries. This positions the Nordic countries at 
risk of a higher price of biomass due to the ETS 
regulations. So, the fact that there is both high 
intensity of use and production inputs puts the Nordics 
at a high risk - which could lead to carbon leakage. 
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Electricity generation in Finland 
There are around 120 electricity-producing companies 
and around 400 power plants in Finland. More than 
half of those are hydropower plants, but the utilization 
ratio of plants depends on the water-level situation, 
and replacement energy by using coal and other 
fossil fuels is occasionally needed (Sähköntuotanto, 
2020). Cogeneration Heat and Power (CHP) has been 
used in many residential areas in Finland. This is a 
method in which generated electricity produces heat 
which is then used to warm buildings through the 
district heating network (Ministry of Economic…, 
2019). One third of generated electricity has been 
produced using the CHP method that it enables up to 
90% effi  ciency of used fuel (Sähköntuotanto, 2020). 
Most of the electricity used in Finland has been 
produced in Finland. However, the share of imported 
electricity was 23% in year 2019 (Energiavuosi..., 
2020). 86 TWh of electricity has been used in total 
in 2019 which is 1.7% less than in 2018. The pie 
chart (fi gure 1) represents the reference values 
in 2018 based on the data from Energiateollisuus 
(Sähköntuotanto, 2020) while in 2019, 27% of 
electricity has been produced by nuclear energy 
and 14% by hydropower (Energiavuosi..., 2020). 
According to Energiateollisuus (Energiavuosi..., 
2020), 33% of the electricity generation was based 
on nuclear power and 19% on fossil fuels, while the 
total electricity generation was 67 TWh in 2018. 
Most of the electricity imported is from other Nordic 
countries (over 15%) and the remaining ca 8% is 
mainly from Russia. When familiarizing only with 
the CO2 emissions from power plants in Finland 
in 2019, most emissions are caused by the three 
power plants in Helsinki (Hanasaari B, Salmisaari 
B and Vuosaari B) and one in Suomenoja, Espoo 
(Laitoskohtaiset päästötiedot 2013-2019, 2020). 
Finland has ambitious climate targets to be carbon 
neutral by 2035 and a fossil-free welfare society 
by the end of the 2030s (Programme of Prime 
Minister…, 2019: 3.1). Especially, the production of 
electricity and heat should be almost emission-free 
by then. Finland’s Integrated Energy and Climate 
Plan (NECP), that was based on earlier climate 
strategies decided by the Parliament of Finland, 
represents the current national climate targets that 
includes, in addition to that mentioned above, 
the target of increasing carbon sinks (Ministry of 
Economic..., 2019). NECP determines that the share 
of renewable energy should be at least 51% by 2030. 
Nowadays, Finland has challenges with carbon 
leakage in electricity production related to electricity 
import from Russia (Rosslowe, 2020; Selvitys..., 
2020). According to the newspaper (Selvitys..., 2020), 
as well as the report (Rosslowe, 2020), over half of the 
imported electricity from Russia has been produced 
Figure 1: Electricity production by energy sources in Finland 2018 .(%)
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using natural gas, which is a fossil fuel. In other 
words, it would be possible to calculate the following 
hypothesis: while 23% of the electricity production 
is imported in 2019 and ca 6% is from Russia, 
approximately 3% of imported electricity would be the 
carbon leakage electricity. However, more research 
would be needed to confirm the hypothesis, which 
is difficult because of the lack of open-data sources. 
As noted, a crucial part of implementing the climate 
policy is how to replace the used fossil fuels while 
achieving carbon neutrality. There have been 
problems determining carbon neutrality and the 
carbon offsetting that means compensation of carbon 
emissions (Hiilineutraalisuuden pelisäännöt, 2015). 
These problems relate especially to companies who 
must determine at what point they have tried to reduce 
their emissions enough that they have the possibility 
to lean on carbon offsetting. According to Alhola et 
al. (2015), there are a couple of options to determine 
carbon neutrality. The first is that GHG emissions 
must be calculated while reducing as much as possible 
and compensating the rest of the emissions so that the 
net-emissions are zero. The second option is that there 
is no need to compensate after reduction of emissions 
to achieve the number of zero net-emissions. 
In the newspaper (Selvitys..., 2020), a business expert 
recommends a global-level emission trading system 
to solve the carbon leakage problem. In addition, new 
carbon tariffs would steer industries towards more 
sustainable choices. NECP also presents some goals 
for energy supply. There is a need for: taxes for carbon 
dioxide caused energy, developing wood-based fuels 
e.g. using forest chips and promoting wind power, solar 
power and biogas in electricity and heat production 
(Ministry of Economic…, 2019). Moreover, two new 
nuclear power plants are estimated to start-up during 
the 2020s and these “will largely replace imported 
electricity” (Ministry of Economic…, 2019: 56). 
Finland cooperates with other Nordic countries 
to achieve climate targets. The Nordic Council of 
Ministers is an organization that focuses on, amongst 
other things, electricity markets. The idea is to maintain 
common Nordic electricity markets that enable “the 
integration of renewable power generation, security of 
supply [and] demand flexibility and smart networks” 
(Ministry of Economic…, 2019: 20) Cooperation 
enables more comprehensive resources to improve 
energy-efficient and renewable solutions while it is 
easier to represent common Nordic opinions to the EU 
while making EU’s political decisions. There is also 
the target for EU member states to maintain electricity 
interconnectivity to neighbouring EU countries, 
which has resulted in a couple of projects to build 
new electricity overhead lines in Finland (Ministry 
of Economic…, 2019). These projects enable better 
electricity connectivity e.g. to Sweden and integration 
of renewable energy production in Finland. 
Electricity production and SDG indicators 
There are several UN Sustainable Development Goals 
(SDG) that are affected by electricity production 
and carbon emissions and vice versa. However, the 
affected goals and targets vary a lot between scales 
and locations. In the context of Finnish electricity 
production and emissions, the central goal is SDG 
7: Affordable and clean energy, whose main targets 
are to ensure access to affordable, reliable and 
modern energy, increase energy efficiency and the 
share of renewable energy. The indicators measuring 
the progress in SDG 7 are: access to electricity, 
use of clean fuels and technology for cooking, 
CO2 emissions from fuel combustion divided 
by electricity output (MtCO2/TWh) and share of 
renewable energy in total final energy consumption. 
Also, in Goal 12: responsible consumption and 
production, there are indicators connected to 
emissions, such as production-based SO2 emissions 
(kg/capita) and imported SO2 emissions (kg/capita) 
– SO2, sulfur dioxide is a by-product from burning 
fossil fuels – and in Goal 13: climate action, there 
are indicators such as imports of CO2 emissions 
embodied in goods, measured as technology-
adjusted, consumption-based (TCBA) emissions 
minus production-based emissions and effective 
carbon rate from all non-road energy, excluding 
emissions from biomass (€/tCO2). (Sachs et al., 2019) 
As can be seen above, many indicators are connected 
to electricity production and emissions, but they 
are quite specific and concentrate on rather visible 
issues. For example, the indicators do not take into 
account the risk that nuclear power plants pose to the 
environment. Also, wood-based fuels are counted 
as renewable energy sources, although they are not 
completely clear as using wood-fuels also causes 
emissions and the forest industry reduces carbon sinks. 
Fortum: a case study  
The Finnish state-owned energy company, Fortum, 
recently became the largest and majority shareholder 
of German energy company Uniper (Kaurenen & 
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Steitz 2019). Uniper’s carbon emissions in 2018 were 
larger than those of the whole of Finland (Uniper, 
n.d.; ‘Statistics Finland, 2019). This purchase has led 
to criticisms by environmental groups that Fortum 
is ‘riding on two bicycles’ (Hiilivapaa Suomi, n.d.): 
running an advertising campaign that promotes 
the need for a cleaner world (Fortum, n.d.) whilst 
simultaneously becoming one of Europe’s largest 
indirect emitters of carbon with the Uniper deal 
(Moore et al., 2018). Furthermore, Fortum CEO 
Pekka Lundmark, has expressed his support for the 
opening of Datteln 4 - a new Uniper coal power plant 
in Germany (Holmberg et al., 2019: 9). Uniper has also 
threatened legal action against the Dutch government 
for its plans to phase-out coal (Keating, 2019). 
Uniper’s plans for the Datteln-4 coal power 
plant have met with significant opposition from 
environmental groups (Ende Gelände, 2020). This is 
namely because, as studies have shown, in order to 
reach the 1.5 degree target, coal needs to be phased 
out in the EU and OECD countries by 2030 (Rocha, 
M. et al., 2017). Germany however, has set a target 
of coal phase-out by 2038, which Lundmark has 
used as justification for his support for Datteln-4 
(Holmberg et al., 2019: p9). Another justification 
by Fortum is that Dattel-4 will replace less-efficient 
existing coal power plants in Germany, but their 
utilisation rate is currently, relatively low – lower 
than Datteln-4's is predicted to be (Fraunhofer ISE, 
2020). Furthermore, a Greenpeace Germany survey 
found that 68% of Germans oppose the plans for 
Datteln-4's opening (Greenpeace Suomi, 2020). 
Fortum is relatively transparent about its usage of 
coal. It's website states that it currently imports coal 
from Russia for use in Finland, as well as using Polish 
coal in Poland and Russian and Kazakhstani coal 
in Russia (Fortum, n.d.). Their main suppliers are 
SUEK, Maikuben-Komir, Polska Grupa Górnicza, 
Kaproben and Kuzzbassrazrezugol/Carbo One (ibid). 
Uniper are somewhat less transparent, revealing that 
they source coal from Russia, Colombia, USA and 
South Africa as well as 15% from unknown sources 
and 7% from ‘other’ sources (Urgewald, 2020). The 
Russian coal comes predominantly from the Kuzbass 
region, which has faced numerous detrimental 
health and environmental impacts from coal mining 
(Bennets, 2019). These include toxic black snow, 
above the national average rates of cancer, child 
Urban area confronts nature. Photo: Sari Aroalho
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cerebral palsy and tuberculosis and below the 
national average life expectancy (ibid). Furthermore, 
the majority owner of Kuzzbassrazrezugol - Iskander 
Makhmudov - has been accused of organised crime 
and money laundering through Swedbank accounts 
linked to himself and Carbo One, which is the trading 
company of Kuzzbassrazrezugol (Down, 2019). 
Both Uniper and Fortum are members of the 
Bettercoal initiative, which aims to ‘work towards 
a global responsible supply chain’ (Bettercoal, n.d.). 
But only 46% of Uniper’s coal in 2018 came from 
suppliers that had signed up to the Bettercoal code of 
conduct (Urgewald, 2020) and only 66% of Fortum’s 
in 2019 (Fortum, n.d.). Furthermore, Bettercoal has 
come under criticism from environmental groups for 
not taking seriously enough human rights violations, 
for example in Colombia (Urgewald, 2020). 
This case study can be used to argue a number 
of points. Firstly, the negative spillover effects 
brought about by coal leakage go beyond increased 
or exported carbon emissions - we have seen 
human rights violations and direct damage to local 
environments too. Arguably, the longer and more 
complex the global coal supply chain becomes, the 
harder it is for companies like Fortum and Uniper 
to ensure the ethical integrity of their sources. 
Additionally, we are confronted with a broader issue 
of accountability. We have seen how Fortum brands 
itself as a clean energy company, and yet is the 
majority owner of one of Europe’s biggest emitters of 
greenhouse gases (Moore et al., 2018). Fortum itself 
is 50.76% owned by the Finnish government as of the 
end of 2019 (Fortum, n.d.) which leads us to question 
whether Finland can really claim to be world leader 
on climate under these circumstances. At a 2018 
conference, when asked about Datteln-4, Lundmark, 
as we have seen, gave his approval but finished his 
answer by saying …"but more into details I do not 
want to get into – please discuss this with Uniper” 
(Holmberg et al., 2019: p9). But as the majority 
shareholder, can he really claim that this Uniper’s issue 
and not Fortum’s? By definition, the Fortum/Uniper 
case study falls outside the issue of carbon leakage, 
since Fortum is not directly sourcing coal from Uniper. 
Thus, we would argue that there is need for another 
conceptual framework and accountability mechanism 
that holds not just companies, but shareholders 
and investors, responsible for carbon emissions, 
environmental degradation, organised crime and 
human rights violations in the coal supply chain. 
Spillovers 
Electricity production and carbon emissions affect 
many areas of human life and societies, but the effect 
varies highly between different locations. For example, 
in areas where having electricity in the house is not a 
self-evident fact, shortage of electricity might cause 
inequality between people, because it usually falls 
on the poorest. Compared to Finland for example, 
where everyone has access to electricity (at least 
according to SDG measurements), it doesn’t affect 
social issues so clearly, but behind the production 
supply-chains, there can be other huge issues, as 
mentioned in the Fortum-Uniper case. According to 
SDG Index on estimated negative spillover effects 
(Sachs et al., 2019), Finland’s score is 67.1 of 100, 
so there is still a lot of room for improvement. 
In the Finnish context, electricity production has more 
direct interlinkages to environmental issues such as 
emissions and resources, which we have focused on 
more in this report. It is clear, that electricity production 
needs resources and produces emissions, but as the 
SDGs also state, it should be produced efficiently and 
with minimal emissions. This does not happen easily, 
as electricity is essential to industries and people, 
so the demand is always rather high, especially 
in Nordic countries, where heating is essential, 
especially during the cold seasons. Renewable 
energy is highly dependent on the weather conditions 
and water situation, so supply does not always meet 
demand, following that electricity and heat also 
need storage opportunities and additional sources. 
As mentioned before, nuclear energy is the biggest 
energy source produced in Finland after renewables 
then fossil fuels and peat. Although use of coal in 
electricity production is decreasing, it doesn’t mean 
that use of fossil fuels would decrease. For example, in 
2018 use of fossil fuels in electricity production grew 
11% and peat 25% from 2017. Increase in the use of 
fossil fuels was mostly due to an increase in the use 
of natural gas and decreased supply of hydropower. 
Due to increased use of fossil fuels, greenhouse gas 
emissions also grew. (Statistics Finland, 2018) In 
addition, a gas pipeline was opened between Finland 
and Estonia in the end of 2019, which connects the 
Finnish and Baltic states gas markets and which will 
later enable integration into EU’s common energy 
markets (Baltic Connector, 2020). It’s important to 
notice that not all gas in the markets is fossil natural 
gas and greener biogas is potential energy source, but 
it’s use in Finland is still very limited. Increasing use 
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of natural gas is a risk to climate as it might cause so-
called methane leakage. Although natural gas is less 
carbon intensive than, for example coal, and methane 
remains in the atmosphere for a shorter time, it absorbs 
more energy than carbon, so it warms the atmosphere 
more efficiently (IEA, 2020). Often the largest 
emissions and leakages occur at the beginning of the 
supply chain, so the issues are not so easily seen in 
the end products, which are often under observation 
when measuring emissions or other target indicators. 
Conclusions 
According to the Ministry of Economic Affairs and 
Employment (2019), there will be challenges related 
to peak-load situations of electricity demand even 
though electricity network and interconnectivity will 
be improved in the future. Thus, there is a need for 
research that solves the issue of how to shift towards 
a real fossil-free society while demand for electricity 
increases and energy-efficiency is more challenging 
to achieve with renewable energy sources. In 
addition, there is a need to determine carbon neutrality 
and what are the common practices to achieve 
it, with or without compensation mechanisms. 
The direct effects of EU-ETS on carbon leakage, 
and coal leakage in particular, need more 
research. The data that can be found at the time 
of writing is not vast, and more studies should be 
done to properly be able to compare the effects 
on different countries and different markets. 
Skyline, City of London. Photo: Julia Viertola
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Availability of data related to carbon or coal leakage 
is limited, especially when narrowing down the 
topic to apply to Finland. The availability depends 
on the energy companies and, on the other hand, 
political decisions about how wide an access to data 
researchers should have to form truthful decisions 
about climate actions. Based on the available data, we 
found out that the situation of coal-use in electricity 
generation in Finland is relatively good compared 
to the global level, while Finland has used coal the 
most compared to the other Nordic countries. In 
addition, based on the limited range of sources that 
we have, the hypothetical share of carbon leakage of 
total generated electricity used in Finland would be 
approximately 3% today. The share relates to imported 
electricity generated by natural gas in Russia that 
is not part of emission trading schemes. However, 
Finland cooperates with other Nordic countries and 
has ambitious climate targets which will prohibit 
the use of coal in electricity and heat production 
by 2029. The situation of natural gas consumption 
in electricity generation should be studied more 
in the future, especially because it can be expected 
to rise due the new connections to Baltic markets. 
This is where the Fortum case study becomes crucial. 
As Fortum has made it clear, one of their motivations 
for the Uniper purchase is increasing access to 
natural gas resources (Hyvärinen, 2019). This raises 
the question of whether current coal leakage may be 
replaced by gas leakage in the future, which despite 
being less polluting than coal, is still a fossil fuel. 
As we have seen, the Fortum case study raises other 
important questions about the issue of ‘leakage’ 
beyond carbon emissions. Above all, it demonstrates 
the high levels of international connectivity and 
complexity in fossil-fuel supply chains, and how 
viewing these issues through a national framework 
can be somewhat limiting. Since climate change 
does not respect national borders, it seems somewhat 
counterproductive for our collective response to 
be limited by them – and as such, transparency 
in supply-chains as well as robust responses to 
spillover effects are of paramount importance. 
25
References 
Alhola, K., Judl, J., Norris, G. A. & J. Seppälä (2015). Carbon Game is On! Companies on the move to be  
 carbon neutral. Final Report 06/2015. 
Baltic Connector (2020). Project purposes and objectives. Retrieved April 21.2020, from http://balticconne 
 ctor.fi/en/the-project/ 
Bennets, M. (2019, February 15). Toxic black snow covers Siberian coalmining region. The Guardian. Ret- 
 rieved April 16, 2020, from https://www.theguardian.com/environment/2019/feb/15/to   
 xic-black-snow-covers-siberian-coalmining-region#_=_  
Bettercoal (n.d.). Who We Are. Retrieved April 16, 2020, from https://bettercoal.org/who-we-are/ 
Convery, F. J. (2009). Origins and development of the EU ETS. Environmental and  Resource Economics,  
 43(3), 391–412. doi:10.1007/s10640-009-9275-7 
Down, AK. (2019, March 18). Swedbank Scandal Doubles, Implicates Organized Crime. Organised Crime  
 and Corruption Reporting Project.  Retrieved April 16, 2020, from https://www.occrp.org/en/dai  
 ly/9396-swedbank-scandal-doubles-implicates-organized-crime 
Ende Gelände (2020, February 2) Occupation of power plant Datteln 4 a huge success. Retrieved April 16,  
 2020, from https://www.ende-gelaende.org/en/news/occupation-of-power-plant-datteln-4-a-huge- 
 success/ 
Energiavuosi 2019 Sähkö (2020). Energiateollisuus, SlideShare. 3.4.2020. <https://www.slideshare.net/ener 
 giateollisuus/energiavuosi-2019-sahko-214566794> 
European Commission (2019). Report on the functioning of the European carbon market. Retrieved from  
 https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=COM:2019:557:FIN 
Fortum (n.d.) Corporate Governance. Retrieved April 16, 2020, from https://www.fortum.com/about-us/in 
 vestors/corporate-governance 
Fortum. (n.d.) Fortum and Coal. Retrieved April 16, 2020, from https://www.fortum.com/about-us/media/ 
 press-kits/fortum-and-coal 
Fortum. (n.d.) Yhdessä kohti puhtaampaa maailmaa. Retrieved April 16, 2020, from https://www.fortum.fi/ 
 jointhechange 
Fraunhofer ISE (2020, February 3) Percentage of full load of hard coal power units in Germany in 2019.  
 Retrieved April 16, 2020, from https://energy-charts.de/percent_full_load.ht    
 m?souce=coal&year=2019 
Graus, W. H. J., Voogt, M., & Worrell, E. (2007). International comparison of energy efficiency of fossil   
 power generation doi:10.1016/j.enpol.2007.01.016 
Greenpeace Suomi. (2020, February 26). Selvitys: Ylivoimainen enemmistö saksalaisista vastustaa Fortum/ 
 Uniperin uutta Datteln 4 -hiilivoimalaa – tänään voimalan piippua koristaa Suomen lippu. Retrieved  
 from https://www.greenpeace.org/finland/tiedotteet/3806/selvitys-ylivoimainen-enemmisto-saksa  
 laisista-vastustaa-fortum-uniperin-uutta-datteln-4-hiilivoimalaa-tanaan-voimalan-piippua-koris  
 taa-suomen-lippu/ 
Hickel, J. (2019, December 6). The Dark Side of the Nordic Model. Al-Jazeera. Retrieved from https://  
 www.aljazeera.com/indepth/opinion/dark-side-nordic-model-191205102101208.html
Hiilineutraalisuuden pelisäännöt (2015). Finnish Environmental Institute, Helsinki. 20.4.2020. <https://  
 www.syke.fi/fi-FI/Tutkimus__kehittaminen/Tutkimus_ja_kehittamishankkeet/Hankkeet/Hiilineutraa 
 lisuus>
Hiilivipaa Suomi. (n.d.) Kuusi faktaa Fortumista ja Uniperista. Retrieved April 16, 2020, from https://hiili 
 vapaasuomi.fi/fortum/ 
Holmberg, M., Lundmark, P. & Rauramo, M. (2019, February 1). Fortum Q4 Full-Year Results 2018. 
 Retrieved from https://www.fortum.com/sites/default/files/investor-documents/q4_2018_transcript. 
 pdf 
Hyvärinen, E. (2019, October 9). 7 things to know about Fortum’s Uniper acquisition. Fortum. Retrieved  
 April 21 from https://www.fortum.com/about-us/blog/forenergy-blog/7-things-to-know-about-for 
 tums-uniper-acquisition  
Häyhä, T., Franzese, P. P., & Ulgiati, S. (2011). Economic and environmental performance of electricity 
 production in finland: A multicriteria assessment framework doi:10.1016/j.ecolmodel.2011.10.013 
26
IEA (2020), Methane Tracker 2020, IEA, Paris <https://www.iea.org/reports/methane-tracker-2020> 
Kaurenen, A. & Steitz, C. (2019, October 8). Finland's Fortum to gain control of Uniper in $2.5 billion deal.  
 Reuters. Retrieved from https://www.reuters.com/article/us-fortum-uniper-m-a/finlands-fortum-to- 
 gain-control-of-uniper-in-2-5-billion-deal-idUSKBN1WN0JQ  
Keating, D. (2019, December 2). Dutch Lawmakers Under Pressure Over Coal Phase-Out. Forbes.   
 Retrieved from https://www.forbes.com/sites/davekeating/2019/12/02/dutch-lawmakers-under-pres 
 sure-over-coal-phase-out/#760695d64dc8 
Kioton pöytäkirja (2019). Ministry of the Environment, Helsinki. 8.4.2020. <https://www.ym.fi/fi-FI/Ympa 
 risto/Ilmasto_ja_ilma/Ilmastonmuutoksen_hillitseminen/Kansainvaliset_ilmastoneuvottelut/Kioton_ 
 poytakirja> 
Kivihiilen energiakäytön vuonna 2029 kieltävä laki voimaan huhtikuun alussa (2019). Finnish 
 Government, Helsinki. 8.4.2020. <https://valtioneuvosto.fi/artikkeli/-/asset_publisher/kivihiilen-ener 
 giakayton-vuonna-2029-kieltava-laki-voimaan-huhtikuun-alussa?_101_INSTANCE_LZ3RQ  
 Q4vvWXR_groupId=1410877> 
Laitoskohtaiset päästötiedot 2013-2019 (2020). Energy Authority, Helsinki. 9.4.2020. <https://energiaviras 
 to.fi/paastokaupan-julkaisut> 
Ministry of Economic Affairs and Employment (2019). Finland’s Integrated Energy and Climate Plan. 
 Publications of the Ministry of Economic Affairs and Employment 66/2019.  <https://julkaisut.valtio 
 neuvosto.fi/bitstream/handle/10024/161977/TEM_2019_66.pdf?sequence=1&isAllowed=y> 
Moore, C. et al. (2018). Last Gasp: the coal companies making Europe sick. (Europe Beyond Coal). 
 Retrieved from https://beyond-coal.eu/wp-content/uploads/2020/02/Last-Gasp-2018.pdf 
Nordic Council of Ministers. (2019). Carbon leakage in the Nordic countries What are the risks and how to  
 design effective preventive policies? doi:10.6027/TN2019-525
Official Statistics of Finland (OSF). (2018). Production of electricity and heat [e-publication]. 
 ISSN=1798-5099. Helsinki: Statistics Finland [referred: 16.4.2020]. Access method: http://www.stat. 
 fi/til/salatuo/2018/salatuo_2018_2019-11-01_tie_001_en.html 
Programme of Prime Minister Sanna Marin's Government (2019). Government Programme, Helsinki.   
 9.4.2020. <https://valtioneuvosto.fi/marinin-hallitus/hallitusohjelma/hiilineutraali-ja-luonnon-moni 
 muotoisuuden-turvaava-suomi> 
Rocha, M. et al. (2017, February) A stress test for coal in Europe under the Paris Agreement (Climate 
 Analytics). Retrieved from https://climateanalytics.org/media/eu_coal_stress_test_report_2017.pdf 
Rosslowe, C. (2020). The Path of Least Resistance: How electricity generated from coal is leaking into the  
 EU. 40 p. Sandbag. 
Sachs, J., Schmidt-Traub, G., Kroll, C., Lafortune, G., Fuller, G. (2019): Sustainable Development Report  
 2019. New York: Bertelsmann Stiftung and Sustainable Development Solutions Network (SDSN)  
 (links: https://sdgindex.org/ , https://sdsna.github.io/2019GlobalIndex/2019GlobalIndexIndicatorPro 
 files.pdf> 
Selvitys: EU-maat ulkoistavat päästöjään naapurimaihin tuomalla yhä enemmän halpaa hiilisähköä (2020).  
 Helsingin sanomat, Helsinki. 3.4.2020. <https://www.hs.fi/ulkomaat/art-2000006387714.html> 
Statistics Finland. (2019, May 23). Greenhouse gas emissions increased, emission allocation exceeded. 
 Retrieved April 16, 2020, from https://www.stat.fi/til/khki/2018/khki_2018_2019-05-23_tie_001_ 
 en.html 
Sähköntuotanto (2020). Energiateollisuus, Helsinki. 16.4.2020. <https://energia.fi/energiasta/energiantuotan 
 to/sahkontuotanto>
Total primary energy supply, 2017 (2020). IEA. 3.4.2020. <https://www.iea.org/regions/europe> 
Uniper. (n.d.). Climate action and security of supply. Retrieved April 16, 2020, from https://cr.uniper.energy/ 
 en/climate-action-and-security-of-supply/ 
Urgewald (2020, March 6). Webinar 4: Fortum/Uniper’s dirty coal supply chain [Video File]. Retrieved   
 April 16, 2020, from https://www.youtube.com/watch?time_continue=1699&v=EadlEFHxHgU&fea 
 ture=emb_title 
27
The impact of the EU’s agricultural policy on 
West Africa




The European Union (EU) wants to be seen as a 
global player in the sustainable development scene. 
The UN Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs), are 
according to the European Commission “our shared 
roadmap for a peaceful and prosperous world” 
(European Commission, n.d.-a, ”EU approach 
to sustainable development“). One important 
aspect of the SDGs is that they ought to be seen as 
multilateral and global. This report will be mainly 
looking at the multilateral relationship between the 
EU and members of the Economic Community of 
West African States (ECOWAS). Further on in this 
report, the area will be referred to as West Africa.
The EU committed over 58 billion euros to 
agriculture and rural development in their budget 
from 2019 (Definitive adoption (EU, Euratom) 
2019/333 of the European Union’s general budget 
for the financial year 2019). The majority of the sum, 
a total of 40 billion, consists of direct payments. To 
put this in perspective, 40 billion is more than the 
total annual GDP of a small country. Estonia, for 
example, had a GDP of less than 30 billion in 2018 
(World Bank, 2019). The EU has a great interest in 
supporting the farmers of Europe but also admits 
that it impacts Global South (Blanco, 2018). This 
report analyses these impacts from an economic, 
environmental, political and social perspective.
Aim of report
The aim of this report is to analyse the relationship 
between the EU’s agricultural policies and the 
effect they have had on West African societies. This 
relationship is complex and in this report the focus 
lies on a specified geographical extent, West Africa. 
The geographical viewpoint allows for area-specific 
conclusions about spillover effects. There is no 
guarantee these effects are relevant in other areas, 
but there is definitely a need for researching this in 
other regions; we can see for example, that the EU 
biofuel policy has caused a loss of natural habitats 
in both Brazil and some Asian countries (Prins et al., 
2011). So, there is reason to suspect EU’s agricultural 
policies affect other parts of the world as well.
It is important to analyse the impacts of the EU’s 
agricultural policies, since it is a large amount of 
the total EU budget and also because the EU and its 
member states are committed to the implementation 
of the SDGs. For a long time now, the policies 
made by the EU have been criticised by various 
media outlets, see Tran (2011) and Livingstone 
(2018), to name a few. Spillover effects are not 
always easily identified and this report aims to give 
a broader overview of how West Africa is being 
affected. It is good to bear in mind that the SDGs 
are global, and that the whole world is trying to 
overcome the common problems that the world is 
facing. If the EU’s agricultural policies are causing 
problems for West Africa in achieving the SDGs, 
that means that it is counterproductive. Therefore, 
it is crucial for analysing the spillover effects that 
these policies have, so that the common SDGs can 
be met by the global community by the year 2030.
Materials
The materials in this report consists of various 
sources. The main source consists of academic articles 
and official reports made by established institutions, 
such as the EU. This report also includes sources 
from trustable news media. The chosen approach 
seemed reasonable, since there is a lot of information 
available in academic journals and reports about the 
subject. Another argument for using an approach that 
includes both reports by institutions and news articles 
is, that it gives a broader perspective on the issue.
Discussion
EU’s Common Agricultural Policy  
The Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) is the 
agricultural policy of the European Union. It 
supports farmers and ensures Europe’s food security, 
implementing agricultural subsidies and other 
programmes. Regional inequalities have existed 
between Western European countries and Central and 
Eastern European countries that were less developed 
with relatively many rural areas. Members of the 
European Economic Community (EEC), founded by 
the Treaty of Rome at the time in 1957, recognized that 
it is difficult to achieve the goals of the common market 
with acknowledging the importance of agriculture in 
terms of employment and the need to improve the 
income of the agriculture sector, and the individual 
intervention of the governments of agriculture. 
In 1962, EEC introduced the CAP in the agricultural 
field and three major principles of the CAP 
29
had been established: market unity, community 
preference and financial solidarity. The CAP 
was the first common policy of the EU and since 
then and has been an important position in the 
European institutional system. It made a significant 
contribution to European integration. In addition, 
the CAP played an important role in the policy of 
income redistribution among member countries. It 
is managed and funded at European level from the 
resources of EU’s budget. After several reforms, the 
CAP’s budget was reduced from 73% of EU’s total 
budget in 1985 to 37% in 2017 but it still occupies the 
largest category (Parliamentary Budget Office of the 
Houses of the Oireachtas (Irish Parliament), 2018).
The CAP is a partnership between Europe and its 
farmers, and between agriculture and society. It 
aims to: 1) support farmers and improve agricultural 
productivity, ensuring a stable supply of affordable 
food, 2) safeguard European Union farmers to make 
a reasonable living, 3) help tackle climate change 
and the sustainable management of natural resources, 
4) maintain rural areas and landscapes across the EU, 
5) keep the rural economy alive by promoting jobs in 
farming, agri-foods industries and associated sectors.
The CAP provides direct subsidies for farmers 
producing any commodity on their land except fruit, 
vegetables and potatoes through subsidy policies 
such as minimum price guarantees and import tax 
on certain goods outside the EU. Direct subsidies 
are provided as follows: 1) to keep their land in 
good agricultural and environmental condition, 2) to 
contribute to the development of agriculture, such as 
diversification and establishing a farmer union, 3) to 
operate farmland that contributes to the environment.
In assessments of the CAP performance, it is 
positive that the CAP has greatly contributed to 
the stabilization of agricultural product prices 
within the EU and the modernization of agricultural 
management. However, on the negative side the CAP 
has been criticized that the CAP’s subsidies lead to 
distortions and inefficiencies in resource allocation, 
which hinders the growth of developing Global 
South and limits structural changes and innovation 
in the agricultural industry of the EU. According 
to European Committee of the Regions (2019), the 
CAP subsidies “lead to countervailable subsidies or 
dumping where the former refers to price suppression 
and lost sales by other countries, and the latter to export 
sales below the cost of production in the EU” (p.1). 
The subsidies of CAP continue to have a production-
stimulating effect in spite of the CAP reform path 
for recent decades (European Committee, 2019).
To cope with the criticism and new challenges, the 
Common Agricultural Policies has been continuously 
pursuing reforms. The CAP, which was planned 
to attain self-sufficiency of food in a situation of 
food security and support farmers’ stable income, 
led to an overproduction of agricultural products 
and serious budgetary problems for the EU. In 
the 1980’s, the costs for stockholding and export 
subsidies were rising, which triggered a first serious 
reform aimed at redressing the system deficits (Fritz, 
2011). The European Commission (n.d.-c, para.9) 
noted the timeline of the CAP reform and it shifted 
support scheme from market to producer in 1992. 
Price support was scaled down and replaced with 
direct payments to farmers, encouraging them to be 
environmentally friendlier. In this year, the reform 
coincided with the 1992 Rio Earth Summit, which 
established the principle of sustainable development. 
In 2003, the CAP reform cut the link between 
production and subsidies and provided income 
support. Farmers received income support on 
condition of looking after the farmland and fulfilling 
food safety, environmental and welfare standards. 
The 2013 CAP reform aimed to strengthen the 
competitiveness of the agricultural sector, to promote 
sustainable farming and innovations, to support 
growth and jobs in rural areas and to move financial 
assistance towards using lands productively. At the 
same time, Common Monitoring and Evaluation 
Framework (CMEF) was established with the 
aim of measuring the performance of the CAP 
implementation for 2014-2020. In 2018, with higher 
ambition of environmental and climate actions, the 
European Commission presented that after 2020 
the CAP will continue to ensure access to high-
quality of food and strong support for the unique 
European farming model, based on nine objectives: 
1) to ensure a fair income to farmers, 2) to increase 
competitiveness, 3) to rebalance the power in the food 
chain, 4) climate change action, 5) environmental 
care, 6) to preserve landscapes and biodiversity, 7) 
to support generational renewal, 8) vibrant rural 
areas, 9) to protect food and health quality (European 
Commission, n.d.-b, “Legislative proposals” para.2)
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EU’s Common Monitoring and Evaluation 
Framework
The European Commission evaluates and monitors 
CAP through common monitoring and evaluation 
framework (CMEF). The CMEF includes different 
kinds of rules, indicators and procedures and it is 
used for assessing the performance of the CAP and 
improving its efficiency. According to The European 
Commission (2015, 5) the CMEF “--will provide to 
administrations, and to all those interested in agriculture 
and rural development, key information on the CAP 
implementation, on its results and on its impacts.”
Monitoring and evaluation are two different, but 
mutually complementary, functions. Monitoring is a 
continuous process, that produces quantitative data of, 
for example, budgetary inputs and the implementation 
of instruments. In other words, monitoring tells 
what the current state of a certain process is and 
demonstrates the progress of the policies. Evaluation, 
in turn, explores the results, effects and impacts of 
interventions. The aim of evaluations is to provide 
evidence for decision-making and improve the 
effectiveness of CAP (European Commission, 2015).
The three main objectives for the CAP 2014-2020 are:
1. Viable food production: to contribute to food 
security by enhancing the competitiveness of EU 
agriculture while providing the means to address 
the challenges faced by the sector related to market 
disruptions and the functioning of the food chain.
2. Sustainable management of natural resources 
and climate action: to ensure the long-term 
sustainability and potential of EU agriculture 
by safeguarding the natural resources on 
which agricultural production depends.
3. Balanced territorial development: to contribute 
to the socioeconomic development of rural 
areas, while fostering the right conditions for 
safeguarding structural diversity throughout 
the EU (European Commission, 2015).
The core purpose of the CMEF is to assess whether 
the CAP is achieving these goals. In order to be able to 
monitor and evaluate these broad main objectives of 
the CAP, the objectives need to be broken down into 
smaller sub-objectives that can be measured with the 
help of indicators. The CMEF includes two types of 
Vineyards in Europe. Photo: Sari Aroalho
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indicators. The first ones are performance indicators, 
which contribute to the assessment of the performance 
of the CAP. Performance indicators measure, for 
example, employment rates of primary sector, 
greenhouse gas emissions, EU’s share in global agri-
food exports, labour productivity in agriculture and 
numerous other phenomena related to the performance 
of CAP. Performance indicators exist at three 
different levels: output indicators, result indicators 
and impact indicators (European Commission, 2015).
The other indicator type is context indicator. 
Context indicators provide information on socio-
economic, sectorial and environmental trends that 
are likely to have an impact on the implementation, 
achievements and performance of the CAP. There 
are all together 45 context indicators which provide 
information, among other things, on population, 
poverty rates, agricultural area, land cover, farming 
intensity etc. (European Commission, 2018).
The information gained from monitoring and evaluation 
is supposed to improve the future policies. However, 
improvements are made only from the European 
point of view. The main objectives of the CAP, as 
well as the indicators that measure the performance 
and effectiveness of the policy, concentrate solely on 
the effects and achievement in the EU area, and the 
other parts of the world are not considered. In other 
words, the EU’s official monitoring and evaluation 
tool for the CAP totally ignores the spillover effects.
The EU and its member states are committed 
to Policy Coherence for Development (PCD). 
The aim of the PCD is to take the development 
objectives into account in policies that are likely 
to affect developing countries. PCD is recognized 
as a crucial instrument to achieve the Sustainable 
Development Goals. The goal is that the PCD is 
applied across all policies (European Commission, 
2019). Yet, the PCD does not cover the CAP. 
A cross-cutting study report of the impact of the CAP 
in Global South has been published in 2018 by the EU. 
The report states that for the last two decades, strong 
progress towards PCD has been made, but more 
systematic impact assessment of the CAP’s external 
effects is needed. The impacts of the CAP on EU 
agriculture are assessed and evaluated systemically 
with consistent methodology, whereas external effects 
are only roughly estimated through review of relevant 
studies. To be able to align the CAP with the SDGs, 
specific PCD indicators are needed. In addition, the 
complex interaction between different policy sectors 
as well as EU’s and countries’ in Global South 
policies should be better considered (Blanco, 2018).
Impacts of the Common Agricultural policy in West 
Africa
In the case of the West African states, the European 
Union is the region’s most important trading partner 
in both imports and exports. The EU member states 
absorb 43% of the area’s agricultural exports, and 
48% of its total food exports. Likewise, the EU is 
also the main trading partner in imports. It covers 
23% of the area’s agricultural imports and 22% of 
food imports. (Torres & van Seters, 2016.) However, 
in general the countries in Sub-Saharan Africa 
have diversified their networks of import source 
countries and export destinations over the years, 
as the EU’s shares of the total trade for the region 
have fallen 10% for imports and over 20% for 
exports between 1995 and 2012 (Matthews, 2014).
There is a lack of diversification in exports of 
agricultural products in the West African countries, 
with the main products being cocoa (with 44% 
of total agricultural exports), rubber and cotton. 
(Torres & van Seters, 2016.) Agricultural exports of 
each country are heavily reliant on just one to three 
products. This dependency leads to vulnerability 
to fluctuation in global market prices and is 
considered to be a remnant from the colonial days. 
Additionally, a lack of diversification in agricultural 
exports can lead to increased vulnerability to the 
effects of climate change (Blein et al., 2008).
EU’s use of export subsidies has also been an 
issue in Africa, as the Union’s export surplus is 
dumped on the local market, with the consequence 
of distorting product prices. Local farmers struggle 
to compete with the prices, and the situation puts 
their livelihoods at risk. However, this phenomenon 
also has positive effects for the average consumer, 
as subsidized products from the EU increase food 
availability and reduce prices, especially for the 
urban areas (Matthews, 2014). Nevertheless, in the 
words of one of the most notable critics of CAP, 
Ghana native and former UN secretary general 
Kofi Annan, “We are a continent with all the 
land, with lots of unemployed, lots of small-scale 
farmers, most of them women, and yet we import 
85 billion dollars of food per year” (Tefer, 2017). 
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The use of subsidies by the EU and other countries 
such as the US means that surplus products is often 
sold cheaply in third world markets such as those 
in West Africa, creating distortion in food prices 
which affect the native farmers the most. The 
types of agricultural products which are distorting 
markets in West Africa includes wheat produced in 
Britain exported to Nigeria and Senegal, powdered 
milk from the EU exported to Mali and chicken 
thighs and wings exported to Senegal and Ghana (a 
demand which was previously met by local farmers 
which now only supply 11% of the market) (The 
Independent, 2006). From these figures we can 
see that exportation of surplus products leads to a 
reduction in the number of farmers in native countries. 
European Union abolished the milk production 
restrictions it had imposed on each member state 
in 2015, which led to increased dairy production, 
especially in the countries that export dairy products to 
West Africa. The countries with the largest projected 
production growth are Ireland, the Netherlands and 
Germany. The main export product for the West 
African market is milk powder. The production chains 
European dairy companies are creating in West Africa 
engage local industries very little and mostly for 
packaging and distribution, while engagement with 
local milk producers remains marginal. The increased 
dairy exports from the EU may discourage local 
governments from attempting to develop the local 
dairy sector. (Orasmaa, Duteurtre, Corniaux; 2016.) 
European dairy producers have also been accused 
of dumping lower quality produce on the African 
market, as skimmed milk powder mixed with palm oil 
has been rapidly expanding its market share in West 
Africa in recent years. The product is more affordable, 
but it has fewer nutritional benefits and consumers 
are often unaware of the actual contents due to 
lacking labelling laws. (Marks & Livingstone, 2019.)
An environmental impact not seen in West Africa, 
but which occurs in countries with subsidised 
farming is intensive farming practices which are 
known to be environmentally damaging due to the use 
of chemical pesticides among others. This is due to 
the security of fixed prices for their product, making 
it more economically viable for farmers to use all 
available land for increased profit (The Guardian, 
2003). This practice is attempting to be curbed by the 
EU with the introduction of schemes to encourage 
land fallow and meeting environmental standards, 
however overproduction still remains an issue.
An environmental impact, which can be seen in 
much of modern agricultural distribution practices 
globally, is the buying of large carbon footprint 
products and the lack of locally sourced products. As 
part of the SDGs climate action goal, all countries 
as part of reducing their carbon footprint should be 
reducing unnecessary transportation of food products, 
and one would argue that forcing local farmers out 
of business prevents this goal from being achieved. 
The environmental impacts in West Africa, caused by 
EU’s agricultural policies have not been thoroughly 
researched. The climate crisis is a global problem, 
and pollution emitted in one country will not stay 
within the borders of that country. Additionally, 
the lack of diversification in agriculture in West 
Africa will pose a problem in the face of climate 
change.  It is possible that EU’s agricultural policies 
might have a big spillover effect in West Africa and 
the relationship needs to be further investigated. 
Social impacts vary depending on location and 
agricultural sector, but most are attributed to the loss 
of a farm and hence income. In an interview with a 
Cameroon chicken farmer, Fritz writes that due to the 
competition of low-priced products on the market, the 
loss of their business meant a knock-on effect to their 
children’s education, and also a financial strain of 
having unpaid debts (Fritz, 2011). Such social impacts 
reported here could link to other unreported impacts 
that link SDGs such as quality education and gender 
equality. If we look at the potential impacts of farms 
closing more generally, the effect it would have on the 
community could include the likelihood of ex-farming 
families leaving an area to find work in cities, and this 
could impact communities due to reduced number of 
services (shops, transport links) should the number 
of people in an area reduce greatly. Also, thinking of 
the emotional cost to families and the communities, 
since the farming family referenced in Fritz report 
held the farm since 1995 and lost it around 2002, and 
it would not be surprising if generations of farming 
families were lost due to farm closures (Fritz, 2011). 
The pressure on African agriculture and the sector 
is not limited to the EU’s CAP scheme; pressure 
from the WB and IMF to make African nations 
make free trade rules (scraping their own tariff and 
subsidies schemes) in exchange for loans only makes 
the spillover effects from CAP more damaging to 
African nations’ economies (The Independent, 2006). 
33
When looking at a country’s agricultural sector, you 
have to bear in mind food security. Looking at the 
current global food situation due to COVID-19, you 
can see food shortages in products such as pasta as 
this product is produced in other countries (such as 
Italy) which are now no longer producing, leading to 
a reduction in this product in other countries. Should 
the EU stop exporting foods in amounts which these 
countries have come to rely upon, this could create food 
shortage in certain products, which could affect various 
areas of the country (such as economy, productivity). 
Food security is highest when the products which 
a country needs are produced within its borders, 
and the CAP is preventing this which could lead to 
serious implications for a country’s general security.
Future aspects
The current CAP will end by 2020 and the new 
CAP for 2021 to 2027 has been proposed. This CAP 
beyond 2020 is meant to be “more responsive to 
current and future challenges such as climate change 
or generational renewal, while continuing to support 
European farmers for a sustainable and competitive 
agricultural sector” (European Commission, n.d.-b., 
“Legislative proposals” para. 1). The future CAP 
will be based on 9 objectives, none of which take 
into consideration the spillover effects of these 
policies in developing countries. These policies are 
meant to be better for the adaptation that will come 
with the current climate crisis. CAP 2021-2027 
will keep agriculture in the EU competitive. There 
seems to be little consideration of how the new 
policies will affect West Africa. For the agricultural 
sector in the EU, the new CAP will be a reassuring 
support and perhaps it will also be successful in 
keeping European landscapes green, but so far, 
the West African landscapes are being neglected.
There have not been many papers published with 
reflections over what the new CAP will bring. Some 
voices from the development sector have been heard 
and pointed out that there is a lack of coherence 
with EU’s agriculture policies and their stand on 
development and human rights (Barbière, 2019). A 
clear understanding of what the future brings is hard 
to determine, but we can determine that the aim of 
the EU’s new CAP strategy is to keep the European 
agricultural sector active and as an important player in 
the international agricultural scene, also in the future. 
West Africa, with less institutional corporations 
Boy bicycling between corn fields. Photo: Julia Viertola
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in the agricultural sector and much smaller assets 
and weaker agricultural intensification strategies 
than the EU, is going to continue having a difficult 
situation in keeping the agriculture sector alive.
On the other hand, there are a lot of opportunities for 
West Africa in the future. The Food and Agriculture 
Organization of the United Nations (FAO) reports 
that food security has increased in West Africa since 
the 1990’s (Hollinger, 2015). Overall the report 
shows that the potential for West Africa is large. The 
economic stability is increasing and if some assets 
are put in place for developing the agricultural sector, 
the region might stand much stronger against the 
agri-food imports from the EU and other parts of the 
world where they can afford to support the agriculture.
Conclusions
The EU has taken an active role in shaping the 
2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development, and 
therefore the CAP reform was expected to fortify 
achieving SDGs. Additionally, future reforms were 
expected to be more coordinated with policies on 
trade, development and the environment, as the 
Union has been criticized for incoherence between 
policies in the past. (Blanco, 2018) However, from 
the most recent proposal of CAP 2021-2027, it 
seems that spillover effects on the developing world 
will largely be ignored by policymakers (European 
Commission, n.d.-b., “Legislative proposals” para. 1)
The spillover effects of the EU dumping its 
surplus agricultural products on West African 
markets may become tangible in the coming 
months, as the COVID-19 crisis is expected to 
disrupt supply chains and agricultural production, 
leaving countries that rely heavily on food 
imports at risk. In situations such as this, local 
agricultural capacity becomes vital (Dahir, 2020).
Overall, the amount of data we have found shows 
that, at least, the economic spillover effects of the 
CAP are documented (mainly by NGOs) and that the 
EU has recognised and tried to implement changes 
to the policy due to global scrutiny. Although the 
changes are being made, one would argue the lack 
of documented social impacts and impacts other 
than economic ones shows a lack of regard for data 
concerning African farmers and the impacts the 
CAP has caused them. We would argue that research 
needs to be done to document these effects, and that 
focus should not rest solely on economic impacts. 
It is therefore unsurprising that concerns raised 
in this report are all brought up in the executive 
summary of the EPs Policy Department, Directorate-
General for External Policies report on The 
impact of the Common Agricultural Policy on 
developing countries from 2018 (Blanco, M. 2018).
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Global impacts of the European fashion industry
Alisa Redding, Theresa Riedel, Ida Roikonen
Introduction
Is the age of the sweatshop in the past? (BBC 2019)
Primark and the high street: Why are the wor-
kers who make our cheap clothes paying 
with their lives? (The Independent 2013)
Do you know what’s happening to your clo-
thing donations? (Washington Post 2020)
These questions concerning fashion are normally not 
part of our everyday life but need to be faced in order 
to accomplish the Sustainable Development Goals 
(SDGs) of fighting poverty, diminishing pollution, 
and other important topics of our time. Through its 
sourcing, production, and consumption the fashion 
industry has one of the widest global distributions 
and a quite high (economic) significance world-
wide (Baden & Barber 2005). It is responsible for 
8-10% of the global greenhouse gas emissions, 20% 
of the global industrial wastewater pollution, and an 
approximately 500 billion euros are lost every year 
due to the lack of recycling and underutilisation of 
clothing (UN Alliance for Sustainable Fashion).
The (fast) garment industry provides cheap, low-
quality, trend-based clothing to consumers. In order 
to do so, the companies use unethical, exploitative, 
and cost-cutting methods to lower their production 
costs and maximize their profits. Supply chains 
and productions have been outsourced to cheaper 
labour countries and the workers suffer from long 
working shifts, low wages, and inhumane working 
conditions (Lambert 2014, CCC et al. 2015).
Aim of report
The following report aims to give an overview of all 
the different aspects concerning the fashion industry 
and its supply chains, focussing on its environmental 
and social impacts. Furthermore, it critically analyses 
how the SDG’s are targeting this industry and tries to 
work out which aspects might be missing. Through 
a short case study, the report examines the develop-
ment of H&M towards a more sustainable supply 
chain and tries to analyse the current state of the com-
pany to fulfil their aims also considering the SDGs.
Materials
The main body of work that is conducted for 
this report is a literature review of studies over 
the quality and quantity of the fashion industry. 
The literature chosen consists of investigative 
journals, official intergovernmental studies, reports 
by non-governmental organizations, campaigns, 
and documentaries. The range in literature allows 
the report to cover multiple perspectives on the 
industry and report any inconsistencies that arise 
especially in international governmental reports. 
Difficulties arose when looking for studies and articles 
concerning the spillover effect and SDGs of the 
second-hand clothes (SHC) trade. It seems that 
the SHC trade is not directly seen as part of the 
fashion industry and therefore is not further 
analysed. Moreover, the literature reviewing the 
sustainable development of H&M critically were 
mostly published by humanitarian organisations. 
Other studies by researchers took the H&M 
website itself as a reference and were praising - 
sometimes without looking at other studies - the 
improvements H&M published on their own website. 
Discussion
SDGs for Fashion
In 2015, the UN released the 2030 Agenda for 
Sustainable Development, a comprehensive plan 
for countries to follow in order to decrease the 
overall negative impact on the planet. SDGs cover 
many factors, besides environment, also education, 
employment opportunities, gender inequalities and 
country infrastructure. While a reduction in negative 
spillovers is not an individual goal of the 17 SDGs, 
they affect the possibilities to realize Agenda 2030 
globally. For example, a well-developed country 
cannot receive a perfect score in Goal 13 – Climate 
Action – if they continue to pollute less developed 
countries by shipping their waste there. The spillover 
impact is an essential factor in constructing a more 
accurate image of a country’s performance in 
sustainable development, and especially in analysing 
the global impact of Europe’s fashion industry. 
Few SDGs explicitly outline indicators relevant to 
the fashion/garment industry. Under SDGs for Better 
Fashion (SDG Action#28041) four goals are listed. 
Goal 4: Ensure inclusive and equitable quality edu-
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cation and promote lifelong learning opportunities 
for all. Goal 9: Build resilient infrastructure, promote 
inclusive and sustainable industrialization and foster 
innovation. Goal 12: Ensure sustainable consumption 
and production patterns. Goal 13: Take urgent action 
to combat climate change and its impacts. The aim 
of this project is the “implementation of sustainable 
design strategies, promoting the use of sustainable 
technologies and appropriate resource management 
throughout the textile supply chain, proposing new 
business models and engaging with consumers for bet-
ter consumption habits” (SDGs for Better Fashion). 
However, the implementation of methodologies is 
lacking. Students and companies are given lectures 
and exhibitions are open to the public. In terms of im-
pact, these methods are weak. An even further look 
into their deliverables and timetables reveal very low 
impact with engagement in three public events totals, 
outreach to 100 students through a fashion workshop, 
and a free webinar offered to consumers. This action 
plan does nothing to address systemic issues in the 
supply chain, worker rights, or environmental degra-
dation – to name a few. Additionally, this action plan 
fails to include other SDGs that would be relevant, na-
mely; Goal 5: Achieve gender equality and empower 
all women and girls, Goal 8: Promote sustained, inclu-
sive, and sustainable economic growth, full and pro-
ductive employment and decent work for all, and Goal 
10: Reduce inequality within and among countries. 
Across the world, “women comprise the majority of 
the footwear and garment manufacturing workforce” 
(Ethical Fashion Report 2019). Therefore, discus-
sions on living wages inherently involve a gendered 
perspective of women’s equality and empowerment. 
And for the majority of workers, wages are so low that 
it leaves them, and their families, trapped in the cycle 
of poverty (Ethical Fashion Report 2019). Their work 
conditions differ depending on the company, factory, 
and country of where they work. Safety standards 
continue to improve but concern still remains over fire 
safety regulations and structural defects of the facto-
ries in where they work. Goals 5, 8, and 10 all can be 
applied to address these issues in the fashion industry. 
Clearly the action plan is not large-scale nor 
attempting to implement global change, but few 
action plans exist with the fashion industry in 
mind. Will the appropriate SDGs be implemented 
without a cohesive action plan between countries 
and companies to improve working conditions, the 
supply chain, and environmental impact? And when 
the SDGs are implemented will they be done so by 
taking into account the perspectives and realities 
of workers or only what is officially reported? For 
many, the garment industry is their livelihood and 
direct criticisms of their working conditions may not 
be given publicly. Without honest or knowledgeable 
feedback about different steps along the supply chain, 
it will be hard to determine how effective any of the 
SDGs really are, and if they are being implemented. 
It is already an issue in factories that ethical working 
initiatives that are supposedly adopted are rarely ever 
followed. So how can we ensure accountability?
Launched in 2019, the UN Alliance for Sustainable 
Fashion attempts to address the multiple 
fashion-related spillovers of the industry by specifically 
working with fashion industries, organizations, and 
initiatives worldwide to implement SDGs. One 
such initiative is the Ethical Fashion Initiative that 
works directly with the UN Fashion Alliance and 
is partnered and supported by the European Union 
and the International Trade Centre, The EFI works 
“to contribute to poverty reduction by supporting 
the creation of sustainable and decently paid jobs 
for artisans from disadvantaged communities in 
Haiti, Africa and Central Asia” (Ethical Fashion 
Initiative – Ethics). The EFI reports that their 
work directly contributes to SDGs 1, 4, 8, and 12. 
By working directly with the artisans, the initiative 
aims to reduce the spillovers that can occur when 
European brands are unaware or choose to ignore 
the unsafe and exploitative factories they produce 
their clothing in. They have also developed a code 
of conduct that allows informal sectors not in 
direct cooperation with the initiative to achieve 
the status as “EFI Compliant” (Ethical Fashion 
Initiative – Ethics). Similar sorts of initiatives with 
codes of conduct have been created but whether 
they are correctly implemented remains a question. 
The Ethical Trading Initiative, an independent 
organization, aims to implement a base code of conduct 
among the supply chain in order to create a space 
for workers to “bargain with management through 
trade unions” (Ethical Trading Initiative – About). 
In an ideal world, this could work, but oftentimes 
the women working in these factories are hardly in 
the position to bargain nor argue over their wages or 
working hours. Many women come from villages to 
work and the jobs are in high demand. Those who 
do not comply with the rules will easily be replaced. 
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And when it comes to a company’s code of 
conduct, how well are they followed? According to 
Zara’s Code of Conduct, working hours should not 
be excessive, but the working hours reported by Pub-
licEye found that one factory had two shifts to cover 
round the clock working (Kollbrunner 2019). Does 
this reflect a purposeful gap in Zara’s own Code of 
Conduct due to unclear terminology or a violation of 
the code by the supplier? These are perhaps the most 
challenging questions to answer when deciding who 
exactly is responsible for what. There needs to be 
change and improvement on all levels of the supply 
chain. From the top of the chain where clothes are 
designed and marketed, to the factories producing 
the clothing. Brands need to be made aware if their 
quotas overwhelm the factories and similarly, facto-
ry managers need to be held accountable for uphol-
ding codes of conduct that limit excessive working 
hours or unsafe working conditions. Without proper 
transparency and communication on all levels of 
production, exploitation will continue to take place. 
Supply Chains
Social sustainability
The worst disaster to date that the fashion industry 
has faced happened in Bangladesh in April 2013. 
The Rana Plaza garment factory collapsed due to 
poor building safety standards, which resulted in 
the death of over 1100 factory workers, who were 
producing garments for global fashion brands. 
(Rafi-Ul-Shan, Grant & Perry 2016). The fashion 
industry had already faced a lot of criticism before, 
but after these shocking events, there has been an 
increased focus in safety and sustainability issues in 
the fashion industry. However, there is no universally 
accepted definition of sustainability and the interests 
of different stakeholders make these issues complex.
The social issues often associated with fast fashion 
are workers’ rights and working conditions. These 
include for example inequality, poverty, access to 
health care and education, forced labour, working 
hours and work safety. A common problem in many 
developing countries is also child labour, which is 
mostly caused by other social issues mentioned pre-
viously. Also, many other problems are linked to 
each other, which is why they pile up in the same 
areas and with the same people. Fashion compa-
nies are taking advantage of lower labour costs by 
outsourcing production to developing countries, 
which often means also taking advantage of the 
local people. Health and safety standards are 
usually lower than in developed countries and moni-
toring practices less strict. (Rafi-Ul-Shan et al. 2016). 
Fashion companies have tried to introduce solutions 
for these problems. Ethical codes of conduct, 
sustainability reports and programmes can be found on 
many companies’ websites. As an example, Inditex’s 
Annual Report (2016) mentions four SDG’s and 
explains how the company contributes to achieving 
them. The mentioned SDG’s are Goal 3: Good health 
and well-being, Goal 5: Gender equality, Goal 8: 
Decent work and economic growth, and Goal 17: 
Partnership for the goals. The company’s contribution 
is mostly based on different programmes, policies, 
and co-operations. It is clear that Inditex has 
put an effort into improving workers’ conditions 
and takes these issues seriously. However, the 
report had truly little information about how the 
programmes and policies work in practice and how 
Inditex ensures that these are followed throughout 
the supply chain. Similar statements can be found 
in H&M Group’s Sustainability Performance 
Report (2019). They highlight for instance 
identifying risks, collaborating with partners, and 
committing to respect human rights. The same 
questions arise as with Inditex when reading this 
report. Everything seems to be well planned, but again, 
the lack of concrete actions and results is distracting.
A worrying example of poor monitoring can be seen in 
a documentary series Verta, hikeä ja t-paitoja (2020) 
produced by YLE, Finland’s national broadcasting 
company. In the seventh episode of the series the 
protagonists visit a garment factory in Myanmar, 
where the workers produce clothes for international 
brands. The factory does have a set of rules on its 
wall, made by the Ethical Trading Initiative. The 
rules include nine promises about workers’ rights 
and working conditions in the factory. Already 
in this short episode they find out that at least two 
rules, one about working hours and one about 
wages, are not followed. The workers do not complain, 
because they do not want to risk losing their jobs. This 
is just one example, but it raises a lot of questions. 
If the rules are broken in this factory, how many 
other manufacturers break the rules and how severely? 
Does the European company on the other end of the 
supply chain have any idea about what is happening?
It seems like nowadays many companies and con-
sumers are aware of the social issues related to the 
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fashion industry. Also, it seems like people want to 
make good choices as consumers and companies 
want to make sure their supply chain is thoroughly 
sustainable. The problem lies in the lack of knowled-
ge and information. If the companies do not have 
proper tools to make sure their codes of conduct are 
followed, it is diffi  cult to track where the problems 
of the supply chain are. This is confusing for the 
consumer. It is diffi  cult to make sustainable choices, 
if it is not clear, which choices are sustainable. 
Environmental sustainability
The supply chain in the textile industry can be geo-
graphically long and complex. It starts from agricul-
ture (for natural fi bres) and petrochemical production 
(for synthet-ics) and continues to manufacture, logis-
tics and retail. The fi rst steps take place mostly in the 
Global South. Some of the most signifi cant material 
producers and garment manufacturers these days 
are China, India, Bangladesh, and Southeast Asian 
countries. Retailers and consumers on the other 
hand are mostly located in Europe and the USA. 
Textile waste is found globally. (Niinimäki et al. 
2020). Each step has an environmental impact, 
because of water, energy, material, and chemical use. 
However, the consequences are distributed uneven-
ly. The Global South, where the textile and clothing 
are largely produced, bear the burden for the Global 
North, where the products are consumed (see fi gure 1).
Textile production uses large amounts of water. 
Figure 1. Garment-manufacturing supply chain. The key steps of garment production, geo-graphical loca-
tions, and environmental impacts. (Niinimäki et al., 2020).
Cotton has the highest water footprint of any fashion 
fi bre, and its cultivation and the wet processes of 
textile manufacturing, such as bleaching and dyeing, 
require trillions of litres of water annually. Globally, 
44% of cotton is grown for export, so foreign 
demand causes about half of the local water use 
impacts of cotton cultivation. (Niinimäki et al. 2020). 
This causes problems especially in arid regions, 
where groundwater and drinking water losses 
complicate the daily lives of local people. Also 
waste water from the fashion industry impacts 
local water supplies. If the wastewater is not treated 
properly, there is a risk that toxic chemicals are 
released in nature, which causes harm for the people 
and the ecosystem. The fashion industry causes 
10% of annual global carbon emissions (World 
Bank 2019). This comes from high energy use and 
the sources of the energy used. For example, textile 
manufacturing in China relies mostly on coal-
based energy. The phase where energy use and CO2 
emissions are highest is in fi bre extraction, es-pecially 
with synthetic materials. Additionally, the production 
method has an impact on the environmental 
consequences. Even though natural fi bres have a 
lower carbon footprint in comparison to synthetic 
ones, processes like cotton cultivation require lots of 
chemicals, such as pesticides. (Niinimäki et al. 2020).
All these fi rst steps in the life cycle of a garment 
usually take place in the developing world. In 
addition, the environmental regulations in the-
se countries are often not very strict. Even though 
the impacts of transportation and increasing 
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textile waste can also be seen in the developed 
countries, it is still undeniable that the worst hazards 
and eff ects of pollution have been shoved to the 
developing world. The impacts of the fashion industry 
speed up climate change, which has an infl uence on 
the whole world. However, the worst risks are not 
spread out equally, since many developing countries 
are located in the areas that are most vulnerable for 
natural disasters and extreme weather events, and 
climate change increases the risk of these hazards. 
As with the social impacts, European fashion 
companies have tried to tackle the environmental 
impacts with diff erent programmes and initiatives, 
but it looks like some-thing much bigger has to be 
done. The whole industry should reinvent itself, 
as the World Bank (2019) and many NGOs have 
suggested. The era of fast fashion should come 
to an end and the transition to a more sustainable 
model should begin. This requires changes from both 
companies and consumers. As consumers, changing 
our habits to buying less, prioritizing quality, and 
wearing clothes longer would already make an 
impact. For fast fashion companies the changes are 
much bigger and might require a lot of time. 
Changing the whole business model from fast 
production and low prices to environmental 
sustainability and quality materials does not 
happen overnight. Technology and research could 
be part of the solution and help to create more 
sustainable ways for the fashion industry to operate.
Second-hand clothes: Curse or blessing?
The story of our clothes often doesn’t stop in a 
cupboard. They travel further, either participating in 
the global waste fl ows as part of the over 750,000 
tons of textiles thrown away every year (see follo-
wing article) or they are recycled and then sold to 
the Global South, where they are worn in everyday 
life. In general, the second-hand clothes (SHC) tra-
de takes only a small proportion of the total global 
traffi  c of fashion (less than 0,5 percent), but especially 
for the Sub-Saharan African countries it’s one of the 
most dominant economics concerning clothes (see 
fi gure 2) (Fairwertung 2019; Baden & Barber 2005).
What consumers of the Global North are often not 
aware of is the fact that clothes given to charity 
organisations aren’t always directly delivered as free 
goods to those who need them, operating more as a 
business instead (see fi gure 3). One of the reasons for 
this is that clothes recycled in the Northern Hemis-
phere are not always fi t-ting the climatic and cultu-
ral circumstances in the receiver countries and thus 
need to be sorted out. Clothes that cannot be sold by 
the local charity shops in the Global North are then 
often traded to commercial textile recyclers. The 
commercial recyclers sell the clothing abroad which 
is quite profi table and has a wide variety of impacts. 
The relationship between the charity organizations 
and commercial companies, the fi nancial issues, and 
the aspect of turning a donation into a trade is not really 
Figure 2: Global fashion fl ows (Botma 2019).
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published and consumers are not always aware of 
this connection (Norris 2012). Recycling is therefore 
a quite easy way to make money and the former 
intentions of consumers – sustainability and especially 
helping others in need with their free donation - 
turn out to be secondary. There has only been little 
research on this wide unregulated and internationally 
working market (Norris 2012), but the Figure 1 below 
shows a rough structure of what it might look like. 
The import of SHC into the countries of the 
Global South and their infl uence on the local 
economies are subject to a wide range of discussion. 
There are two diff erent main opinions on the impact 
that SHC have on the importing countries. Some 
researchers say that large imports of recycled clothes 
cause huge damages on the na-tional economy 
and the local fashion industry (Norris 2012). This 
led for example in the 1990s to a decline in the 
Kenyan textile industry. However other researchers 
argue that this relationship isn’t necessarily causal as 
the “traditional” clothes aren’t worn daily anymore. 
The assumption of the repudiators that fewer 
imports of second-hand clothes would lead to an 
increase in the local fashion industry are widely 
criticised and might not be correct as the struggles of 
local fashion industry are not only caused by second-
hand imports but also by a lack of capital or other 
unfortunate conditions like no electricity or the lack 
of a continuous supply chain. Moreover, the rather 
small fashion industries in the Global South might 
not be able to fulfi l the demand of clothes needed. A 
ban on imports of new SHC would not necessarily 
lead to the recovery of the local fashion industry as 
the trade of cheaper fashion from Asia is increasing. 
In the rural regions of Africa people can mainly 
choose between second-hand or new Chinese clothes, 
which can be unaff ordable or made from synthetics 
not favouring the mostly hot and humid climates, so 
that the people are dependent on the SHC (Baden 
& Bar-ber 2005; Fairwertung 2019; Norris 2012).
In most of the receiver countries the majority of 
the traders, also of locally produced clothes, seem 
to have a more or less neutral view on the competi-
tion with the SHC trade, as they don’t off er the same 
(quality) of goods. Therefore, the negative impacts of 
SHC trade on the own fashion industry is perceived 
as rather low. Of course, this is not the case in all the 
importing countries (Baden & Barber 2005). Some 
countries like Rwanda or Kenya tried to ban the SHC 
imports arguing that their economy was suff ering 
under the huge negative impacts of the dominant SHC 
trade. Big exporters like the US claimed that these 
bans were violating international trade agreements 
and researchers argued that they would additional-
ly lead to the growth of the illegal SHC trades. This 
intense reaction might also be based on the fact that 
the countries of the Global North benefi t greatly from 
Figure 3: Recycling chains (based on Baden & Barber 2005).
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the SHC trade as they eliminate big textile waste 
in their own countries, which causes huge 
problems in their landfills. These landfills are costly 
to operate, mostly with tax dollars and are 
quickly filled. Therefore, countries of the 
Global North are rather exporting their “was-
te” clothes to developing countries, which has 
kind of a dumping effect on them (Opati, 2019).
Even without a ban the SHC trade has alrea-
dy a quite strong informal sector which unlike the 
formal one is not accompanied by social or legal 
protection for employees and in some cases, facili-
tates considerable custom frauds by passing of new 
clothing as SHC. These illegal imports of goods and 
corruption in general have a huge impact on the na-
tional economies and the SHC trade itself. To stop 
these practices researchers recommend controlling 
all the parts of the trade and standardizing all the 
steps (Baden & Barber 2005, Fairwertung 2019). 
However, the importing countries can also benefit 
from the SHC trades for example, through the crea-
tion of a wide range of jobs and earning good money 
as market traders, or through washing, mending, and 
ironing the clothes. Furthermore, the second-hand 
trade offers the possibility for people with rather low 
income to follow the fashion trends of Europe and 
the US, which is, especially for the younger genera-
tion, quite important. As in Europe and North Ame-
rica, fast fashion is getting more and more common 
and the quality of the clothes mainly coming from 
Asia isn’t as good anymore this might lead to a “na-
tural” decline of SHC exports and a growth of waste 
in the future (Norris 2012; Baden & Barber 2005). 
Researchers suggest that the impact on the local fashion 
industry can be reduced through a shift towards a 
production for the export market and a specialisation 
on a particular type of textile. By investing into new 
equipment to improve the production processes 
the entrance into the global fashion industry would 
be easier and locals could compete on the global 
market. This would require big investments that 
might not exist in developing countries (Opati 2019).
The opinions on SHC trade are truly diverse. Due to a 
lack of data and studies of the real extent, impact and 
spillover effects of SHC trade are not yet analysed 
properly, but it is obvious that regulations are needed, 
especially to avoid the dumping effect of economically 
strong countries to the Global South. But what kind 
of regulations could work and how is it possible to 
include all the different opinions into this process? 
How can it be avoided that the economically strong 
Global North overrules the receiver countries in order 
to keep their advantages of textile waste dumping? 
Case Study H&M: Sustainability pioneer or 
“greenwashing”? 
Fashion brands such as Adidas or C&A are 
often blamed for their rather unsustainable supply 
chain and their little effort to make changes, 
while others like H&M are planning to make chan-
ges in their supply chains through the inclusion of 
different standards in their agenda (Shen 2014). In 
this short case study we try to figure out if the in-
ternational working company of H&M is real-
ly making changes in their production of clothes 
towards sustainability or if their whole campaign is 
in some way just a kind of so called “greenwashing”.
H&M is a Swedish fashion company with more than 
3000 stores across the whole world, with a higher con-
centration in Europe. As a reaction to the collapse of 
a fashion factory (Rana Plaza) in Bangladesh, which 
was also working for H&M, the company launched 
their sustainability program and their incorporation in 
the Bangladesh Accord Foundation. The accord can 
be seen as an agreement between brands and trade 
unions to work towards a safer and healthier working 
environment in the garment industry of Bangladesh 
through the monitoring of factories and trainings 
for suppliers and their workers (Baydar 2018, Shen 
2014). H&Ms own sustainability program works, 
aligned to the UN’s SDGs, additionally towards 
more job opportunities in less developed countries, 
as well as the education of their consumers towards 
sustainable behaviour (Shen 2014, Illes 2020). 
For its environmentally sustainability H&M tries 
to use mainly organic cotton and is investing in its 
sustainable production. Controls are performed 
by the Better Cotton Initiative, which is helping 
farmers to establish better farming techniques. 
Furthermore H&M cooperates with the WWF to 
improve their water management in all the steps 
of their fashion production following the SDG 
goal of clean water. Aligned to the SDG Goal 12, 
responsible consumption and production, the 
company tries to use recycled materials like 
polyester, plastic, or wool to save energy and 
water, lowering their emission and reducing their 
waste. Additionally, they established an old 
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garment collection program for their customers using 
different categories like re-wear as SHC, reuse and 
conversion into other products or recycle to turn 
them into textile fibres (Illes 2020; Shen 2014). 
Another aspect of H&Ms sustainability program 
as well as part of the officially signed accord is the 
payment of fair living wages to all the workers above 
the minimum wages of their countries. To improve 
the workers’ situation even further H&M promised 
to establish a complaint hotline for them, where 
they can report any critics directly to the compa-
ny, as well as a workers’ representation to manage 
a better communication between the manager and 
the employees (Baydar 2018, CCC et al. 2015).
Altogether, H&M has agreed to make huge imp-
rovements in their supply chain and is publishing 
its progresses on the company website visualizing 
them through maps and studies. After visiting some 
of the garment factories producing for H&M some 
humanitarian organisations blamed H&M for their 
greenwashing, as they couldn’t see any develop-
ments towards better working conditions. Even if 
H&M is positioning themselves towards a more 
sustainable behaviour, their production is still 
based on suppliers in cheaper labour countries with 
a rather low-level of worker protection instead of 
moving it to countries with stricter rules. The promi-
se for fair living wages paid to the workers is far from 
being fulfilled, sometimes the wages even lie below 
the legal minimum wage (Shen 2014, Baydar 2018). 
Even if the complaint hotline and the workers’ 
representations seem to be a good idea, a study stated 
the fears of workers being fired in case they would 
form a worker’s representation. One of the major 
criticisms of humanitarian organisations is that gar-
ment factories which are not following the restric-
tions and rules of H&M aren’t getting any sanctions. 
An analysis by the Clean Clothes Campaign (CCC) 
and other charity organisations showed that even the 
Platinum and Gold suppliers – factories H&M labels 
as their best performers of their sustainability goals in 
their supply chain – are dramatically behind schedule. 
Through poor safety conditions they are putting their 
workers lives at risk and the wages are not even close 
to being fair. CCC claims that H&M is making empty 
promises and is presenting great achievements with 
their campaign even though there are no real impro-
vements being made (Baydar 2018, CCC et al. 2015).
The question if H&M is “greenwashing” cannot be 
answered completely. H&M is presenting itself as a 
pioneer of sustainability in the fashion industry even 
though they are still behind their own schedule. There 
are still big problems to overcome and the studies and 
maps on their websites  are not always showing the 
truth, but at least some successes can be recorded, and 
every step can in some way be seen as an improvement. 
Outlook on European Garment Industries
There is an assumption carried by many consumers 
that clothing produced within Europe for European 
fashion brands are focused on fair and equal treat-
ment of their workers. Assumptions are held in 
reference to the idea that ‘Europe is developed, so it 
must be good.’ This, however, is far from the truth. 
One of Clean Clothes Campaign’s current campaigns 
focuses on the lack of living wages in European 
garment factories. “There is a large gap between 
the legal minimum wages in Eastern/South-Eastern 
Europe and Turkey, and what a worker would actual-
ly need to provide for themselves and their family” 
(Clean Clothes Campaign - Living Wages in Europe). 
Clothing brands can often receive undeserved respect 
for manufacturing their clothes in Europe due to the 
assumptions made from the label. Simply put, “Made 
in Europe” does not guarantee that clothes are made 
fair, with workers facing extremely low wages and 
many other labour rights violations” (CCC - Living 
Wages in Europe). Inditex - the parent company of 
brands like Zara, Pull & Bear, and Bershka, is one 
of the most successful fast fashion industries in the 
world, with a total of 1,597,260,495 clothing items 
sold in 2018 alone (Kollbrunner 2019). In order to do 
so, new clothes and trends are cranked out on a nearly 
biweekly basis. To keep with this pace, manufacturing 
centres are kept close by for cuts in transportation 
time - namely in Turkey. Conditions in these factories 
often mirror the ones found in Asia - excessive working 
hours, low pay, and predominantly women. However, 
fast-fashion brands are not the only ones contributing 
to the problem. Many high-end leather brands 
outsource their labour to countries like Bulgaria, 
Turkey, and Romania (CCC - Living Wages in Europe). 
The women working in these factories are often 
the “breadwinners” for their family but earning 
wages barely enough to support one person, let alo-
ne an entire family. “In Romania for example, with 
almost half a million people the biggest garment 
workforce in Europe, the average wage within regular 
working hours of interviewed workers is as low as 
46
14 percent of a living wage” (CCC - Living Wa-
ges in Europe).  As we work towards improving the 
global spillovers of the European fashion industry it 
is imperative that we acknowledge the impact being 
felt by everyone, even when they are close to home. 
Conclusions
The spillover impact of the fashion industry 
is widespread in almost all sectors of SDGs. 
Environmental degradation begins when cotton is 
picked and plastic textiles like polyester and acrylic 
are produced. A female-majority workforce is paid 
inade-quately along all steps of the supply chain. 
Workers continue to live in poverty while producing 
for billion-dollar industries. Textile waste continues 
to build as clothes are produced at tremendous 
speeds and clothes are improperly recycled or 
dumped in Sub-Saharan and West Africa putting 
pressure on the rather weak local fashion industry.
Fashion brands have a social, ethical, and environ-
mental responsibility to lessen their global impact. 
Doing so is not simple but many organizations 
and initiatives are already in place that provide a 
framework for improving production. A transfor-
mative change is required from these industries; to 
not only revolutionize their concepts of a supply 
chain, but to revolutionize the way the public 
thinks about clothing. As long as the same concepts 
for fast fashion exist, the problems outlined in this 
report cannot truly be erased. An industry that revol-
ves around affordable clothing that is continuously 
switched out to new trends and styles, is not a sus-
tainable operation. Textile waste will continue to 
grow, and laborers will continue to be exploited. 
Can the fashion industry evolve into a sustainab-
le garment industry? Where clothing is marketed 
and sold based on durability and ethicality as an 
investment and not as “this season’s trend”? In order 
to do so brands can start by slowing production and 
focus on creating items that utilize fabric sustainably 
and serve as staples for their brand. Items that are 
always available and not ditched after a few months 
on the shelf. For brands like Zara or H&M a chan-
ge like this would be revolutionary, but it is what is 
necessary for sustainable development. SDGs can-
not be attained in a world that cannot transform their 
habits and values to those that reflect sustainability. 
Photo: Viertola JuliaSewing machine at home in Luang Prabang, Laos. Photo: Julia Viertola.
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Introduction 
Enacted in 2018, China’s “National Sword” ban 
on plastic created a ripple effect across the world, 
especially for Southeast Asian countries. Researchers 
estimate that China’s new plastic ban will displace 
111 million metric tons of plastic waste by 2030 
(Brooks, Wang, & Jambeck, 2018). Since 1992, 
China imported 45% of all plastic waste. China’s 
previous restriction on plastic imports “Green Fence” 
dropped plastic values by $446 million (export) and 
$298 million (import) when it was implemented 
in 2013. Although China will still allow some 
high quality, low contamination, industrial plastic 
waste, consumer goods with the plastic types of 
PE, PS, PVC, PET, and other (e.g. PP) will no 
longer be allowed. The ban includes bales of PET 
bottles, CDs and video disks, as well as aluminum 
plastic film. Given the global dependence on China’s 
recycling infrastructure, where will the waste go? 
There are three main aims of this report about 
global plastic waste flows. Firstly, to examine the 
availability of data on global plastic waste trade 
flows, secondly, to analyze the impact of China’s 
import ban in 2018 on the flows of plastic waste 
and thirdly, to interpret how the plastic waste trade 
and China’s ban interface with the Sustainable 
Development Goals (SDGs). The United Nations 
Commodity Trade (UN Comtrade) Statistics Database 
is used in the report to evaluate fluctuations in waste 
exports and imports. The report’s geographic focus 
is Southeast Asia, where most plastic waste flows 
have been redirected following China’s 2018 ban. 
Aim of report  
Globally plastics are one of the most widely 
used materials (C. Wang, Zhao, Lim, Chen, & 
Sutherland, 2020). Global production of plastics, 
which is increasing at a fast rate, is currently over 
300 million tons per year (W. Wang et al., 2019). 
Consequently, millions of tons of plastic waste are 
produced each year. As a result, the global trade 
of plastic waste has grown dramatically in recent 
decades. Global North export plastic waste to save 
money on waste disposal and Global South decrease 
the manufacturing cost of plastic products because 
recycled plastic is cheaper than raw materials 
(C. Wang et al., 2020). However, less than 10% of 
all plastic waste is recycled to the original materials, 
causing serious environmental and social problems 
(W. Wang et al., 2019). On a global scale, issues caused 
by plastic waste disposal are unevenly distributed, 
causing inequality and environmental injustice. 
During the last three decades, Asia has been the 
dominant importer of global plastic waste due to the 
inexpensive labor, lax environmental regulations 
and low healthcare costs. Between 1991 and 2017 
China was the main importer of plastic waste 
(C. Wang et al., 2020), importing 45% of all plastic 
waste since 1992 (Brooks, Wang, & Jambeck, 
2018). China’s economy has grown, decreasing its 
dependence on the plastic waste trade. Since 2010 
China has gradually implemented stricter waste import 
policies, with new regulations being released annually 
between 2011 and 2013. While these regulations 
included temporary bans and restrictions, a permanent 
ban of nonindustrial plastic waste was announced in 
2017 and adopted in the beginning of January 2018 
(Brooks et al., 2018; C. Wang et al., 2020). According 
to Brooks et al. (2018), it is estimated that China’s 
ban will result in a displacement of 111 million metric 
tons of plastic waste by 2030. This amount is equal 
to almost half of all the global plastic waste imports 
since 1988. Since China’s ban in 2018, plastic waste 
trade flows have been redirected to Southeast Asian 
countries. For example, Thailand’s imports increased 
by 640% from January to June 2018, and Malaysia’s 
increased by 273% (C. Wang et al., 2020). The 
plastic waste trade causes huge environmental and 
social impacts on the countries that are importing the 
waste. China’s ban has had large spillover effects, 
transferring social and environmental problems 
to other countries. The effects of China’s ban, as 
well as the plastic waste trade in general, can be 
analyzed in relation to the SDGs, allowing synergies 
and tradeoffs between these to be identified. 
Global plastic waste is a phenomenon with pervasive 
impacts on a wide range of different issues—what 
makes the topic relevant from geographical point 
of view? As a science, geography focuses on the 
interaction between humans and the environment. 
Geographers analyze the questions regarding cause and 
effect and are well equipped to pay attention to not only 
space, but also to humans, who use their surrounding 
space for economic purposes (e.g. Kahraman 2016, 
p. 121). Global plastic waste flows intertwine with 
several of those themes. As a relatively cheap yet 
long-lasting material, plastic quickly became a widely 
utilized material for manufacturing, packaging and 
shipping. Between 1964 and 2015 the production of 
plastics increased more than twenty-fold. Plastic can 
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be regarded as a significant industrial innovation and 
it has contributed substantially to economic growth. 
(Science and Technical Advisory Panel 2018, pp. 
3-5.) The apparent benefits of plastic have led to its 
widespread nature, but the development has also 
raised problems, especially environmental ones. 
Manufacturing plastic requires fossil fuels, such as 
natural gas and oil. Furthermore, plastics remain in 
the ecosystem for a long period of time; it can take 
up to 500 years for plastic to break down, causing 
a cascade of environment consequences. (ibid.) 
Plastic waste is therefore profoundly connected to 
the economic well-being, but also to the relationship 
between human and nature - in other words, plastic is 
connected to some of the central questions addressed 
by geography. In tackling the problems caused by 
plastic waste it is also essential to recognize some of 
the spatial patterns involved in the phenomenon. The 
increase in both plastic’s economic significance and 
its sheer amount has led plastic waste to become a 
commodity that is sold, bought and shipped around the 
globe. By aggregating and visualizing information, 
it becomes possible to locate the epicenters of a 
societal and environmental challenge like plastic 
waste. In our case study, there can be seen a clear 
spatial pattern, a flow of plastic waste from Global 
North to Global South, specifically to Southeast Asia. 
The global waste trade also raises several questions 
regarding the unequal relationship between rich 
and poor countries. Many geographical research 
traditions, such as critical geopolitics and political 
ecology, can provide valuable insights in analyzing 
the underlying power relationship between different 
areas of the earth and their position in the global waste 
trade. Political ecology analyzes human-environment 
interaction, observing environmental issues through 
the lens of political-economic context and power 
relations that have produced the phenomena 
(McCarthy 2017, p. 2). In the case of plastic waste 
flows, the world has been divided into wealthy 
producers and benefiters of plastic manufacturing, and 
to the poorer areas, who buy plastic waste and inherit 
the environmental problems associated with plastic. 
Historically, most of the plastic has been produced in 
Europe and the United States, although during the recent 
years, the focus of plastic production has shifted to Asia 
(Science and Technical Advisory Panel 2018, p. 5). 
Busy street in Bangkok. Photo: Julia Viertola
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Despite the shift, the European Union and the United 
States remain among the leading exporters of plastic 
waste to Southeast Asian countries. Their position as 
leading exporters can create problems which further 
complicate the handling of plastic waste and the 
environmental problems it causes. For example, non-
governmental organizations, such as Greenpeace, 
have produced reports that illustrate the ramifications 
caused by plastic waste exporting. Rich countries in 
Global North would be far better able to invest into 
the latest recycling and waste recovery facilities, 
than poorer countries in Global South, that are not 
fully prepared to deal even with their domestic waste. 
Pinpointing the biggest importers of plastic waste 
could also enhance consideration about whether 
the international trade system works sufficiently for 
different participants, or if the current international 
legislative framework provides enough protection 
to poor countries. (e.g. Greenpeace 2020, pp. 2-3.) 
Geographical analysis concerning the hot spots 
of global waste trade can also shed light on wider 
problems of inequality across the world. By locating 
some of the most significant importers of plastic 
waste in the world it becomes possible to scrutinize, 
what function does waste trade serve for those 
countries, and what are the economic possibilities in 
those areas. Besides the waste import committed by 
the governments, waste trade provides income also 
for many citizens in those countries. By following 
the global flows of plastic waste draws attention 
on the labor markets in different parts of the world, 
and to the importance of waste picking as a way of 
making a living in a labor market characterized by 
informal work, precarious livelihoods, and loss of 
formal jobs (Millington & Lawhon 2018, p. 1048). 
Materials 
The United Nations Commodity Trade Statistics 
Database (UN Comtrade, 2020) served as our primary 
data source for international plastic trade. The UN 
Comtrade Database is a depository of international 
trade data. From this database, we queried for the 
plastic trade data with the code 3915, which represents 
waste, parings and scrap of plastic. Under this code, 
data is available from year 1996 to 2018 and from 196 
countries. The data is available both as trade values, 
converted into US dollars (USD), and as net weight 
(kg). It is obtained from statistical authorities from 
reporter countries or areas who provide the United 
Nations Statistics Division (UNSD) with the countries’ 
annual international trade statistics data categorized 
by commodities or services and their partner countries. 
Visualizations were created using the UN Comtrade 
data on 3915 (waste, parings and scrap of plastic). 
To create the maps, import and export data was 
collected for China and 10 Southeast Asian countries: 
Brunei, Cambodia, Indonesia, Laos, Malaysia, 
Myanmar, Philippines, Singapore, Thailand and 
Vietnam. In order to capture changes in global 
waste flows after China’s “National Sword” ban, 
trade data from 2017 and 2018 was used. Import and 
export values, measured in both USD and kilograms, 
were added to a table. The difference in trade from 
2017 to 2018 was calculated and added to the 
table. The percent change from 2017 to 2018 was 
also calculated and added to the table. Maps were 
created by joining the UN Comtrade data and 
subsequent calculations to the basemap Admin 
0-Countries, 1:10m cultural vector, version 
4.1.0. provided by the website Natural Earth 
Data. Visualizations were created using QGIS 
3.10 'A Coruña'! For each visualization, a 
diverging colormap reflects an increase or 
decrease in imports or exports from 2017 to 2018. 
Discussion 
Our group searched for information about plastic 
waste trade data collection, the causes of China’s 
domestic plastic import ban and the interlinkages 
of plastic waste flows and SDGs. In several articles 
concerning plastic waste flows, the UN Comtrade 
database was mentioned and used. We found that 
the UN Comtrade database is quite easy to find, but 
cumbersome to use and of questionable validity. The 
statistics 3915 of waste, parings and scrap of plastic 
is easily accessible with just a few clicks. The data 
is sorted by trade value, and one cannot change the 
interface to sort by kilograms. Sorting by weight 
would be a valuable feature and better suited to a 
sustainable development approach, as the monetary 
value of plastic associated with weight may fluctuate. 
The trade value likely determines the sorting order 
because of the UN Comtrade’s focus on international 
trade, and not environmental or sustainable policy. 
This emphasis on trade is probably why there is no 
information on the website on exactly how the data 
is collected, except for that it is reported voluntarily 
by countries. This is suspected to cause the real trade 
numbers being bigger than reported, due to exporting 
countries’ possible attempt to look more humane 
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and importing countries’ possible attempt to hide the 
information about their government’s short-sighted 
solutions from their citizens (C. Wang et al., 2020). 
Even though there are these statistics available on 
plastic waste trade, data accountability is a problem. 
When the UN Comtrade did not offer more than 
these voluntarily reported statistics with emphasis on 
trade and not on data collection, our group looked 
for information about the actual data collection 
elsewhere. We had a difficult time trying to find English 
documentation about the plastic waste trade data 
collection processes in our research area, Southeast 
Asia. Although our group attempted to search for official 
information, the only results that we found were news 
articles, not official sites or academic articles in English. 
While data availability in English may be poor in 
Southeast Asian countries, questions about data 
accountability occur also elsewhere. For example, 
even in a country with high-quality statistic 
production such as Finland, we found contradictory 
information about Finland’s exports within the EU. 
The website of Ministry of the Environment claims 
there is no information about Finland’s export in 
the EU; however, in the UN Comtrade statistics we 
found trade value and weight of Finland’s exports 
also within the EU. This raises questions of how 
this data has been collected and by whom, or why 
the officials say they do not have the information. 
The lack of information on data collection methods also 
raises the question if the collected data is universally 
comparable, since different countries may have 
different data collection methods and classification 
methods when it comes to waste management. It is 
also possible that different actors are not even trying to 
collect real data due to illegal trade and circumvention 
of environmental laws (Wang et al. 2020). Gregson 
and Crang (2015) also criticize the UN Comtrade’s 
classifications as misleading, due to problematic 
categorizations of used and discarded goods, because 
the boundaries of useless waste and useful goods 
and materials are changeable. These classifications 
are political choices, not neutral, objective facts. 
China 
According to UN Comtrade Data, China drastically 
reduced the import of plastic waste and slightly reduced 
the export of plastic waste from 2017 to 2018. In 2017, 
China imported 5,828,749,884 kg of plastic waste 
from across the globe. Following the ban, China’s 
plastic waste imports dropped by 99% to 51,604,609 
kg in 2018. Notably, because China only banned the 
import of consumer plastic waste, the imports did 
not fall to 0 kg. Under the ban, the import of certain 
industrial plastic waste is still allowed. Industrial 
plastic waste, as compared to consumer plastic waste, 
tends to be less contaminated and therefore more 
suitable for recycling (Brooks, Wang, & Jambeck, 
2018). From 2017 to 2018, the trade value in USD of 
China’s plastic waste imports also decreased by 99%. 
In 2017, China imported $3,263,374,809 of plastic 
waste and the trade value decreased to $39,036,264 
in 2018. China reported the export of 29,646,561 kg 
of plastic waste in 2017 and 0 kg of waste in 2018. 
In trade value, China exported $70,845,724 of plastic 
waste in 2017, which decreased by 5% to $67,154 
999 in 2018. Based on the trade value, China’s 
reporting of 0 kg of exports is potentially inaccurate. 
Southeast Asia 
Given the previous magnitude of China’s plastic 
waste imports, there were ripple effects elsewhere 
when the import ban was put into place. Statistics 
alone cannot fully depict how the ban impacted 
neighboring countries in Southeast Asia; however, 
UN Comtrade data demonstrates significant increases 
in plastic waste imports in numerous Southeast Asian 
countries. Based on import value and kilogram weight, 
Malaysia, Indonesia, Thailand, and Vietnam saw the 
biggest increases in plastic waste imports (Figure 1). 
The same four countries also experienced the largest 
decrease of plastic waste exports (Figure 2). From 
2017 to 2018, Malaysia, Indonesia, Thailand, and 
Vietnam experienced increases of 400 million, 322 
million, 192 million, and 41 million kilograms of 
plastic waste, respectively. The Philippines, Laos, 
and Myanmar had more modest import gains. Based 
on percent increase from 2017 to 2018, Thailand, 
Myanmar, Indonesia, and Laos experienced the most 
significant increases in plastic waste imports. Imports 
of plastic waste increased by 262%, 149%, 102% and 
78% respectively (Figure 3). Based on percentages, 
all countries experienced a decrease in plastic waste 
exports by weight. Only the Philippines experienced 
a slight (13%) increase in the export of plastic 
waste by USD value. China and all other countries 
in Southeast Asia experienced a decrease in the 
trade value of their plastic waste exports (Figure 4). 
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Figure 1. Plastic waste import changes from 2017-2018. A comparison of the trade values (USD) and trade 
weights (kg) of plastic waste imports by Southeast Asian countries: Brunei, Cambodia, Indonesia, Laos, 
Malaysia, Myanmar, Philippines, Singapore, Thailand and Vietnam.
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Figure 2. Plastic waste export changes from 2017-2018. A comparison of the trade values (USD) and tra-
de weights (kg) of plastic waste exports by Southeast Asian countries: Brunei, Cambodia, Indonesia, Laos, 
Malaysia, Myanmar, Philippines, Singapore, Thailand and Vietnam. 
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Figure 3. Plastic waste import changes from 2017-2018. Percent change is used to compare changes in 
trade values (USD) and trade weights (kg) of plastic waste imports by China and Southeast Asian countries: 
Brunei, Cambodia, Indonesia, Laos, Malaysia, Myanmar, Philippines, Singapore, Thailand and Vietnam.
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Figure 4. Plastic waste export changes from 2017-2018. Percent change is used to compare changes in 
trade values (USD) and trade weights (kg) of plastic waste exports by China and Southeast Asian countries: 




Both waste in general and plastics specifically are 
mentioned as part of the targets or in indicators of 
three of the SDGs. These SDGs include Goal 11 
“Make cities and human settlements inclusive, safe, 
resilient and sustainable”, Goal 12 “Ensure sustainable 
consumption and production patterns” and Goal 
14 “Conserve and sustainably use the oceans, seas 
and marine resources for sustainable development”. 
Waste is included in target 11.6 of Goal 11, stating 
that the environmental impact of cities should be 
reduced, including by paying attention to waste 
management. Under this target the indicator 11.6.1. 
“Proportion of municipal solid waste collected and 
managed in controlled facilities out of total municipal 
waste generated, by cities can be found. Waste is also 
mentioned under Goal 12 in two indicators and two 
targets. Briefly, target 12.4 states that environmentally 
sound management of all wastes should be achieved 
by 2020 with indicators 12.4.1 “Number of parties to 
international multilateral environmental agreements 
on hazardous waste, and other chemicals that meet 
their commitments and obligations in transmitting 
information as required by each relevant agreement” 
and indicator 12.4.2 “(a) Hazardous waste generated 
per capita; and (b) proportion of hazardous waste 
treated, by type of treatment”. Hazardous waste 
also includes plastic waste. Target 12.5, on the other
hand, states that waste generation should 
be substantially reduced by 2030 through 
prevention, reduction, recycling and reuse. 
Plastics are only mentioned in Goal 14, 
under target 14.1 about preventing and reducing 
marine pollution of all kinds by 2025, in the indicator b) 
“floating plastic debris density” (United Nations, 2019). 
Although waste is mentioned only in some of the 
goals, and plastic waste is not the main target of any of 
the goals, many of the other Sustainable Development 
Goals can also be analyzed from the perspective of 
plastic waste. This is due to fact that all of the goals 
are interconnected. For instance, plastic waste can 
be linked to Goal 3 “Health and well-being”, Goal 6 
“Clean water and sanitation” and to Goal 15 “Life on 
land”. As an example of these, an article published in 
The Guardian, states that after the increase in plastic 
imports to Malaysia studies have shown high levels 
of contamination of water and soil close to the areas 
where the plastic is dumped and according to doctors, 
respiratory illnesses have become more common 
in villages with illegal factories (Giuffrida, 2020). 
All the SDGs are linked to each other, according 
to Pradhan et al. (2017). Thus, synergy occurs 
when progress in certain goals benefits other goals. 
Contrarily, a tradeoff occurs when progress in one 
goal delays the progress of other goals. SDG 12 is 
most associated with trade-offs (Pradhan et al., 2017). 
Furthermore, synergies and trade-offs occur between 
the sustainable development goals and the plastic 
waste trade. For instance, China’s waste import ban 
can be associated with both synergies and trade-offs. 
Waste flows have been predominantly redirected to 
Southeast Asian countries due to the ban. In response, 
many Southeast Asian countries formed temporary 
import bans or revoked permits for imports. Although 
export bans would be a more effective way to decrease 
the waste flows, import bans will have similar effects 
in the long term. Import bans will end the cheap, easy 
ways for dumping waste, which will push developed 
countries to form new disposal facilities and deal 
with their waste domestically (C. Wang et al., 2020). 
According to the website of Synergies among the 
Basel, Rotterdam and Stockholm convention (2019), 
the first steps towards this have already been made 
in May 2019, a year after China’s plastic waste 
import ban, when the Conference of the Parties to 
the Basel Convention, Rotterdam Convention and 
Stockholm Convention agreed on new regulations 
of international plastic waste trade with countries 
with little resources to manage imported waste. 
Another example of the trade-offs and synergies 
related to China’s waste import ban, can be analyzed 
from the perspective of waste pickers. According to 
Millington and Lawhon (2018), informal recycling is 
regarded as an important contribution to the livelihoods 
of many people living in Global South, due to job 
loss and the absence of formal jobs. Therefore, shifts 
in the global waste trade might impact the earnings 
of many waste pickers. For example, according to an 
article by The Diplomat, China’s ban on waste import 
has had a significant negative socioeconomic impact 
on South Korean elderly waste pickers (Seo, 2019). 
The situation of waste pickers can also be associated 
with the SDG 8 “Decent work and economic 
growth”. The goal states that progress is needed to 
reduce informal employment and promote safe and 
secure working environments to create decent work 
for all (United Nations, 2019). Since, the informal 
recycling of waste has been viewed as an extreme 
example of precarity and informality in job markets 
(Millington & Lawhon, 2018), progress towards 
Goal 8 could improve the situation for these workers. 
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Conclusions 
This report has examined the availability of data on 
global plastic waste flows and the effect of China’s 
plastic waste import ban on these flows. In addition 
to this, an analysis of synergies and tradeoffs between 
the Sustainable Development Goals and the global 
waste trade and China’s ban was also provided. 
Geographical research methods are required to 
identify spatial patterns and to obtain a sufficient 
understanding regarding the global flows of plastic 
waste. Geographical analysis provides a diverse 
set of tools to deliberate plastic waste and its wider 
connections with society, politics and the environment. 
For instance, locating some of the global hot spots 
of plastic waste gives valuable guidance about 
whether the international law or national legislations 
in those countries provides enough protection 
for problems like global trade of plastic waste. 
In the light of our research, instead of data availability, 
the main problem seems to be data accountability 
when it comes to the global plastic waste trade. Despite 
availability of the UN Comtrade data collected from 
196 countries, the voluntary reporting of data and the 
lack or inaccessibility of reliable information about 
data collection methods decrease the accountability of 
the UN Comtrade statistics. Keeping these limitations 
in mind, the UN Comtrade data yielded patterns in 
international plastic waste trade. In the same time 
period that China drastically reduced its plastic waste 
imports, most countries in Southeast Asia increased 
their plastic waste imports. All countries in our case 
study, China included, decreased their export of 
plastic waste from 2017 to 2018. When comparing 
the increase or decrease of trade across different 
countries, it was fruitful to compare changes in the 
trade value (USD) with changes in trade weight 
(kg). For future research, expanding the time period 
of the datasets and geographic scale will improve 
understanding of global spillovers in the waste sector. 
The global plastic waste trade and China’s import ban 
can be linked to many of the SDGs, although waste or 
plastic more specifically are mentioned only as part of 
three of them. Additionally, the shift of global plastic 
waste flows to Southeast Asian countries after China’s 
ban can be associated with both synergies and trade-
offs. For instance, although the redirected plastic waste 
causes environmental, health and socioeconomic 
issues, many Southeast countries have begun 
forming their own import bans, which eventually 
might end the plastic exports from Global North. 
In the context of global inequalities, it is always 
interesting how these policies and regulations are 
pushed through and justified politically. According 
to Mederake and Knoblauch (2019), marine debris, 
especially plastic, as an environmental problem 
has recently received significant media attention 
in the Global North. In addition to environmental 
problems, plastic waste and its poor handling 
also causes social and health problems. These 
environmental and social problems are also linked 
to each other, which once again demonstrates why 
sustainable development should be perceived and 
tackled from an environmental, social and economic 
ensemble. In the political realm, many things 
must be or happen to be perceived from a specific 
perspective. Interestingly, in the United States new 
policies on plastic waste have been decided under the 
public health theme, whereas in the EU the plastic 
problem has been politicized from the environmental 
perspective (Mederake & Knoblauch 2019). The 
perspectives from which a problem is perceived 
are a political choice that can be viewed critically. 
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